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INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a steady flow of commentary' on the pro-
priety of disparate impact analysis for age discrimination claims
brought against private-sector employers and state and local govern-
mental entities pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). 2  However, none of that commentary ad-
dresses whether disparate impact analysis is appropriate in ADEA
cases against federal-sector employers, such as federal governmental
agencies. This Article is intended to fill that void.
Section 15 of the ADEA prohibits age discrimination in federal-
sector employment.3 Section 4 of the ADEA, which has been the sole
focus of the above-mentioned disparate impact commentary, also
outlaws age-based employment discrimination, but applies only to
private-sector and state government employers, labor organizations
and employment agencies.! The principal thesis of this Article is that
the unique statutory language of section 15, combined with its legis-
lative history and parallel to corresponding provisions of Title VII of
1. See, e.g.,Jan W. Henkel, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Disparate Impact Analy-
sis and the Availability of Liquidated Damages After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 47 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1183, 1198 (1997) (discussing Supreme Court decisions that diminish a plaintiff's ability
to recover under ADEA); Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing? That is
Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
31 U. RICH. L. REv. 819, 822-23 (1997) (concluding that disparate impact analysis should be
used under ADEA); Kyle C. Barrentine, Comment, Disparate Impact and the ADEA: A Means to
an End orJustice?, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1245, 1246 (1996/1997) (finding disparate treatment pref-
erable standard under ADEA); Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why
Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV.
267, 322-23 (1995) (arguing no congressional intent to make disparate impact available under
ADEA); Jonas Saunders, Note, Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact Under the ADEA After Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments in Favor, 73 U. DET. MERcYL. REv. 591, 593 (1996) (arguing
disparate impact theory should apply to ADEA); Brendan Sweeney, Comment, "Downsizing" the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Availability of Disparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REV.
1527, 1533-34 (1996) (suggesting Congress should amend ADEA to allow plaintiffs to use a dis-
parate impact approach).
2. See29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
3. See29 U.S.C. § 633a (1994).
4. See29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
5. See29 U.S.C. §§ 623(b)-(c), 630(b)-(d) (1994).
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VWI"),6 mandate the continuing
application of disparate impact analysis in ADEA cases against the
federal government.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the difference between dispa-
rate treatment analysis, which requires a showing of specific dis-
criminatory intent, and disparate impact analysis, which does not. Al-
though these theories of liability contain different elements of proof,
at bottom, they represent nothing more than different analytical
routes to the same legal conclusion-discrimination.
Part I further notes that prior to the Supreme Court's 1993 deci-
sion in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins7 courts uniformly had applied dis-
parate impact analysis in ADEA cases. Based on dicta in that case and
Congress' failure to codify disparate impact analysis into the ADEA in
1991, several courts now question or categorically prohibit the appli-
cation of this method of proof in age discrimination cases. All of
these decisions, however, interpret and apply section 4 of the ADEA,
not section 15.
Part II notes that, unlike section 4 of the ADEA, section 15 does
not contain any exceptions to age-based employment decisions. Part
II then argues that because of the Supreme Court's holding in
Lehman v. Nakshian, and the "integration" language contained in sec-
tion 15(f) of the ADEA,9 section 4's exceptions cannot be read into
section 15.
Part II next explains that Congress patterned section 15 of the
ADEA directly after section 717 of Title VII, which bars federal-sector
employment discrimination based on race, sex, color, national ori-
gin, or religion.' Part II continues by arguing that because the statu-
tory language of these two provisions is identical in all relevant re-
spects, and because courts have repeatedly applied disparate impact
analysis in discrimination claims against the federal government un-
der section 717, it follows that this analysis applies in the ADEA con-
text as well. Part II further argues that this conclusion is buttressed
by court decisions that have uniformly applied a disparate impact
analysis under section 15 and by the legislative history of section 15,
which shows that Congress intended to prohibit ostensibly age-
neutral employment practices that have a significant adverse impact
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-16 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995). Tide VII prohibits em-
ployment discrimination because of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (a) (1).
7. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
8. 453 U.S. 156 (1981).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(f) (1994).
10. See42U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a).
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on older federal workers.
Part II briefly addresses the government's potential assertion of a
sovereign immunity defense to ADEA claims based on disparate im-
pact. This Part argues that as disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment are simply two different analytical routes to the same legal con-
clusion, the government's waiver of sovereign immunity for age-
discrimination liability should encompass claims premised upon dis-
parate impact.
Part III examines the legislative history of section 4, concluding
that, as with federal-sector employment, Congress intended to target
facially-neutral, but nonetheless age-discriminatory, employment
practices of private employers. Accordingly, section 4 of the ADEA
provides further support for the use of disparate impact analysis in
federal-sector ADEA claims.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF BURDENS OF PROOF IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
Over the past thirty-five years, Congress has outlawed employment
discrimination on the basis of an individual's membership in any one
of several protected classes, including race, sex, color, national ori-
gin, religion," disability, 2 citizenship status,' 3 and age.'4 During that
time, the federal courts have established two methods for proving
employment discrimination under these statutes: "disparate treat-
ment" and "disparate impact." 5
11. SeeTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-16.
12. See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101- 12213 (1994); Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
13. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) (1994).
14. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 &
Supp. 11995).
15. Arguably, employment discrimination can be broken down into four categories:
(1) disparate treatment, (2) policies or practices which perpetuate the effects of past discrimi-
nation, (3) policies or practices having an adverse impact not justified by business necessity
(disparate impact), and (4) failure to make reasonable accommodation to an employee's relig-
ious observance or practices or to a qualified employee's disability. See BARBARA LINDEMANN &
PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 4 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining that all em-
ployment discrimination cases can be analyzed under one of the four outlined categories which
aid in the understanding of the basic legal elements of a discrimination case); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(2) (1994) (distinguishing between "unlawful intentional discrimination," "disparate
impact," and the failure to provide "a reasonable accommodation" for purposes of recovering
damages for disability discrimination). The focus of this Article, however, is the ADEA, which
contains no explicit duty of reasonable accommodation. Additionally, the "present effects of
past discrimination" method of proof could be viewed as a subset of both disparate impact and
disparate treatment analysis depending upon the facts of the case. Compare Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 409 (1975) (addressing disparate impact challenge seniority system
that utilized racially-segregated lines of progression prior to the effective date of Title VII that
left black employees locked into lower-paying job classifications and with less seniority), and
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (adopting disparate impact analysis in a
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Under a disparate treatment method of proof, "[p]roof of dis-
criminatory motive is critical.' '  Proof of discriminatory motive is not
critical under the disparate impact approach, 7 where the required
proof "involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business ne-
cessity." "  Regardless of whether a discrimination claim is analyzed
under a disparate treatment or disparate impact method of proof,
the core legal issue in a discrimination case is always the same:
whether an individual was a victim of discrimination. Significantly,
the Supreme Court has held that a disparate impact theory of dis-
crimination is functionally equivalent to a disparate treatment the-
ory 9 and that "[e] ither theory may be applied to a particular set of
facts. ' 0
A. Disparate Treatment
An employment policy that explicitly denies an employment bene-
fit because of a person's age, sex or race is the most obvious, and
typically the most unjustifiable, form of disparate treatment.2' Since,
however, as there will rarely be an eyewitness account of the em-
ployer's state of mind, let alone a published, facially-discriminatory
employment policy,' the Supreme Court has developed a three-step
race discrimination case challenging race-neutral educational and testing requirements for
jobs which "formerly had been filled only by white employees as part of a long-standing prac-
tice of giving preference to whites"), with Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346 n.28
(1977) (observing that a facially-neutral seniority system that perpetuates the effect of past dis-
crimination must be a product of intentional discrimination to be actionable).
16. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (explaining that the concept of disparate treatment is
easily understood because it just means someone was treated with less favor because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
17. See id. at 335-36 n.15. According to the D.C. Circuit, both disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment require a showing of intent, but to different degrees.
The legislative history of Title VII indicates that the Act requires only a general intent
to discriminate, and prohibits any discriminatory practice which was not merely acci-
dental. If an employer intends to promulgate the later found to be improper policy-
that is, "the defendant meant to do what he did"-there is no burden to show addi-
tional discriminatory motivation in order to recover under Title VII.
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
18. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
19. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(holding that disparate impact analysis can be applied to a subjective or discretionary promo-
tional system).
20. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
21. An advertisement stating that women or persons over 40 need not apply is but one ex-
ample. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1985) (finding
policy that limited right of 60 year-old pilots to "bump" less senior flight engineers because of
their age was unlawful).
22. See United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (noting evidentiary
difficulty that triers of fact must deal with in discrimination cases). A discriminatory employ-
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procedure for proving intentional discrimination wholly through cir-
cumstantial evidence.'5 Although the Supreme Court fashioned this
three-step analysis in the context of race discrimination cases brought
under Title VII, the lower courts have uniformly applied it to age dis-
crimination claims under the ADEA,24 with the Supreme Court's im-
plicit approval.2s
ment policy also may be shown through compelling circumstantial evidence that
"discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336;
see also id. at 357-62 (outlining the "pattern or practice" method of proof). The pattern or prac-
tice method of proving discrimination takes place in two stages, with distinct burden-shifting
elements. Initially, there is a trial on the existence of the discriminatory policy. If the policy is
shown to exist, mini-trials are held on the claims of individuals who allegedly were adversely
impacted by that policy. According to one court, the pattern or practice theory can be utilized
only in the context of class action. See Lovery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 1998 WL 612926, at
*13 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 1998) (stating that there is no private, non-class cause of action for pat-
tern or practice discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or Title VII).
23. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (stating that in a
Title VII discrimination action, plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima face
case, then the defendant has the burden to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its action,
and finally, the plaintiff must prove the pretextual nature of defendant's reason); see also St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993) (maintaining that trier of fact's rejec-
tion of an employer's stated reasons for its actions does not result in ajudgment for the plain-
tiff as a matter of law, but rather the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to prove
intentional discrimination); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981) (articulating three-part process for proving discrimination). Essentially, the first step of
this indirect mode of proof, the prima facie case, requires a plaintiff to prove that she was
qualified for, but denied, employment or other job benefits in favor of an employee outside of
her protected class. See McDonnell Douglas, 450 U.S. at 802 & n.13. In the second step, the em-
ployer's burden of production, the employer proffers admissible evidence of, but need not
prove, a non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. In the third
step, the establishment of a pretextual motive, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's ar-
ticulated reason is a lie or "pretext" that conceals a discriminatory motive. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at
507-08. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at all steps of this analysis. See id. at 507. This
three-step test is referred to as the McDonnell Douglas test in this Article.
24. See, e.g., Stratton v. Department for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 878-80 (2d Cir. 1997)
(affirming ajury verdict for plaintiff in an age discrimination case because plaintiff sufficiently
showed that employer's reasons were pretextual); Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d
1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (applying McDonnell Douglas test in age discrimination
case); Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Michigan, Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 451 (8th Cir. 1997)
(reviewing plaintiff's option to prove age discrimination mixed-motives approach of Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), or three-step process outlined in McDonnell Douglas);
Zaben v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying McDonnell
Douglas in age discrimination case); Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir.
1997) (same); Coco v. Elmwood Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing
that under the McDonnell Douglas test plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant's reason for
dismissal was pretextual, and that age discrimination may be inferred from the prima facie
case); Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557-59 (10th Cir. 1996) (applyingMcDonnell
Douglas test in age discrimination case); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d
1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 326 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993)
(noting McDonnell Douglas test has been applied in ADEA cases); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d
853, 856-57 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying McDonnell Douglas test in age discrimination case);
Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600
F.2d 1003, 1014-16 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding three-step McDonnell Douglas approach applicable to
age discrimination claims).
25. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)
(assuming, without explicitly deciding, that three-step analysis for proving disparate treatment
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Sometimes, disparate treatment cases fall within a fuzzy area be-
tween facially-discriminatory policies and wholly-circumstantial cases
of intentional discrimination. To facilitate a showing of discrimina-
tory intent, the Supreme Court has held in the context of alleged
gender discrimination that once a plaintiff shows that her gender
"played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant
may avoid a finding of liability only by proving.., that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs gender
into account., 26 This is the so-called "mixed-motives" analysis. In
such cases, where there is substantial evidence that a decision-maker
relied on discriminatory considerations, the burden of proof shifts to
the employer, unlike under the three-step, indirect mode of proof.27
Although the mixed-motives analysis was spawned in the Tide VII
context, 2 it applies to ADEA cases as well.2
through circumstantial evidence applies to age discrimination, consistent with practice of every
circuit court of appeals); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (referring to
proof framework set forth in McDonnellDouglas as applicable to ADEA).
26. Price Waterhouse 490 U.S. at 258.
27. To trigger such an analysis, a plaintiff may submit "direct" evidence of discriminatory
intent ("I won't hire you because you're a woman," or "I'm firing you because you're not a
Christian"). See, e.g., Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 972 (7th Cir. 1997) (ruling against
summary judgment for an employer in a Title VII religious discrimination case where plaintiff
had direct evidence of discrimination because her boss threatened job loss if she did not play
by "God's rules"). Alternatively, a plaintiff may submit evidence of conduct or statements by
persons involved in the decision-making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the
alleged discriminatory attitude. Racist or sexist comments uttered by a supervisor in connec-
tion with an employee's discharge might be one example. See Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins.
Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing sufficiency of proof needed to entitle plain-
tiff to a burden-shifting instruction); Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation &
Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that stray remarks made
by people who are not part of decision-making process fail to meet Ostrowski standard); see also
Thomas v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting
"direct" evidence merely means showing unlawful consideration and does not go to nature of
evidence offered); Veners, 123 F.3d at 972-73 (reiterating that direct evidence of discrimination
involves a person with employment decision-making power who states an "illegal employment
criterion"); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1143 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that plaintiff failed to
make out a mixed-motives case where there was no direct evidence of discrimination).
28. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), partially overruled Price Waterhouse as it applies
to Tide VII cases. Now when a protected characteristic constitutes a "motivating factor" in an
adverse employment action, the employer is automatically liable under Title VII, regardless of
whether the employer would have made the same decision, absent the impermissible motive.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994). The employer, however, can severely curtail the remedies
available to the plaintiff by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it "would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." See id. § 2000e-
5(g) (2) (B).
29. See, e.g., Nitschke v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 68 F.3d 249, 253 (8th Cir. 1995)
(assuming that mixed-motives analysis is allowed under ADEA); Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co.,
54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 44 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating that ADEA cases may be brought under Title VII using pretext or mixed-motives
analysis); Considine v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 43 F.3d 1349, 1366 (10th Cir. 1994) (assuming
that mixed-motives analysis is allowed under ADEA); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768,
771 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994) (permitting argument that mixed-motives analysis is allowed under
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Because "harassment" based on a protected characteristic is a form
of disparate treatment0 in the terms or conditions of employment,
the elements of proof in a harassment case represent yet another of
proving intentional employment discrimination."' Several courts
have applied the harassment mode of proof to the age discrimination
context.
32
B. Disparate Impact
Although evolving since its inception in 1971, the law of disparate
impact, unlike disparate treatment analysis, has not ventured off in
numerous different directions. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 33 the Su-
preme Court held that in the Title VII context "good intent or ab-
sence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment proce-
dures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."3 4
Under such a standard, a company's requirement that employees
possess a high school education and pass a written intelligence test
ADEA but declining to rule so because the issue was not fully briefed). At least one district
court has held that the new mixed-motives provisions of Title VII do not apply to ADEA claims
because the statutory language literally applies only to claims of race, sex, color, national ori-
gin, or religious discrimination. See Siwik v. Marshall Field & Co., 945 F. Supp. 1158, 1162
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding the Civil Rights Act of 1991 only applies to statutorily defined classes
and not to the ADEA because the ADEA has not been amended as Title VII has; therefore, Price
Waterhouse controls). This holding is consistent with those courts that have refused to apply the
new mixed-motives provisions to Title VII retaliation claims. See Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d
680, 684 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that plain meaning of Title VII does not allow for applica-
tion of section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to retaliation claims brought under section
2000e-3), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1253 (1997); accord Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913,
935 (3d Cir.) (concluding that section 107 does not apply to retaliation cases because it
amended only 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, not 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, which deals with retaliation), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997).
30. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (finding a claim of"hostile en-
vironment" to be valid sex discrimination claim under Title VII); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc.,
937 F.2d 1264, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding a racially hostile work environment claim valid
under Title VII).
31. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (holding that for hostile environment sexual harassment to
be actionable "it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment" and also discussing with approval
lower court cases finding a cause of action for hostile work environment claims based on race
and national origin (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982))). Courts
have applied a hostile work environment theory of discrimination to claims against federal em-
ployers. See, e.g., Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1998) (examining sexual har-
assment claims against the U.S. Postal Service).
32. See Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996) (extending hos-
tile work environment theory of discrimination to ADEA); see also EEOC v. Massey Yardley
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244, 1249 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1997) (assuming, without deciding,
that hostile work environment theory applies to ADEA; affirming judgment for plaintiff on jury
verdict). But see Bums v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 175, 180 (W.D. Va. 1997) (holding
that Fourth Circuit would not recognize claims for age harassment).
33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
34. Id. at 432.
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will violate Title VII if such requirements adversely affect a markedly
disproportionate number of minorities,35 unless the requirements sat-
isfy the "business necessity" principle and are shown to be related to
job performance.3
In the seventeen years following the Griggs decision, the Supreme
Court elaborated upon the order and allocation of proof under dis-
parate impact analysis. The Court noted that, to begin the analysis,
the complaining party must make out a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation.37 For example, in a failure-to-hire or failure-to-promote case,
the complaining party must show that "the facially neutral standards
in question select applicants in a significantly discriminatory pat-
tern.
,,ss
The Court reiterated that after the plaintiff shows adverse impact,
the employer bears the burden of proving the business necessity and
job-relatedness of its ostensibly-neutral employment practices.9 Ac-
cording to Griggs, this showing requires that the business practices in
question be a demonstrably reasonable measure of job performance
35. See id. at 429.
36. See id. at 431. Until very recently, the lower courts uniformly applied, or assumed the
applicability of, disparate impact analysis to age discrimination claims under the ADEA. See,
eg., Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1992)
(permitting plaintiffs to rely on disparate impact analysis to prove age discrimination);
Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying disparate impact doc-
trine); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1991) (utilizing
disparate impact analysis); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990)
(applying disparate impact analysis); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir.
1990) (same); MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988) (assuming
the existence of, but not imposing, disparate impact liability); Arnold v. United States Postal
Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (assuming the existence of the disparate impact the-
ory); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986) (applying disparate impact analy-
sis); Akins v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1984) (assuming the exis-
tence of the disparate impact theory); Monroe v. United Airlines, 736 F.2d 394, 404 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1984) (endorsing trial court's use of disparate impact analysis); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe
State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying a disparate impact theory).
37. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (explaining a prima facie case of
discrimination requires a plaintiff to show that facially neutral hiring criteria have a
"significantly discriminatory pattern" in practice).
38. Id.; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 409 (1975) (holding that
complaining party must initially show selection "in a racial pattern significantly different from
that of the pool of applicants") (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802"(1973)).
39. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982) (noting that the employer must
demonstrate job-relatedness); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (requiring the employer to prove job-
relatedness of challenged requirements); Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 408, 425 (reaffirming
Griggs, where the Court unanimously held that employer has burden of proving job-relatedness
and noting that one question before the Court was"[w]hat must an employer show to establish
that pre-employment tests racially discriminatory in effect, though not in intent, are sufficiently
'job-related' to survive challenge under Title VII"); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("Congress has
placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a mani-
fest relationship to the employment in question.").
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and satisfy a genuine business need 0 Consistent with this require-
ment, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,4' the Court endorsed the inter-
pretive guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC"), which require that selection practices having a
significant adverse impact be "predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are
relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evalu-
ated. 4
2
Finally, the Court announced that even if the employer satisfies its
burden of proof, the complaining party may still prevail by showing
that the employer used its selection devices as a "pretext for discrimi-
nation. " Specifically, the complaining party can show that the em-
ployer had other tests or selection devices available that would not
have such an undesirable effect on the protected group of employees
and that would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in
"efficient and trustworthy workmanship., 44
The Court's definition of disparate impact analysis began to un-
ravel in 1988, when a plurality of the Supreme Court modified the
complaining party's prima facie burden by requiring the plaintiff to
isolate and identify the specific employment practices which allegedly
lead to any observed statistical disparities.45 That same plurality held
that the plaintiff retained the ultimate burden of proving that dis-
crimination against a protected group was caused by a specific em-
ployment practice .4 The Court transformed, and reduced, the em-
ployer's responsive burden from one of proving the necessity of its
employment practices to one of merely producing evidence that its
practices are legitimate.
This trend continued in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, s where
the Court held that at the initial step of disparate impact analysis in a
race discrimination case, the complaining party is required to dem-
40. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432, 436 (noting that Congress does not require the less quali-
fied to be hired over the more qualified because of a minority status, but rather that any meas-
urement used to determine a person's qualifications must "measure the person for the job and
not the person in the abstract").
41. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
42. See id at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)).
43. See id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 792, 804-05 (1973)).
44. See id. (quoting McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
45. SeeWatson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion).
46. See id. at 997 (commenting that employers are not required to prove their tests are ac-
curate predictors of job performance, only that the tests bear "manifest relationship" to a le-
gitimate business goal).
47. See id. at 998 (explaining the way in which an employer can demonstrate a manifest
relationship between employment requirement and employment in question).
48. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), rev'd in part by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
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onstrate that "each challenged practice has a significantly disparate
impact on employment opportunities for whites and nonwhites. '"
Thereafter, the employer bears the burden of producing evidence
showing that its "challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the
employment goals of the employer." Instead of business necessity,
the touchstone of this inquiry was now a "reasoned review of the em-
ployer's justification for his use of the challenged practice.""
In 1991, Congress codified and overturned parts of Wards Cove, as
it applied to Title VII cases, by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("CRA") 2 Like Wards Cove, the CRA requires a Title VII plaintiff to
demonstrate that the employer "uses a particular employment prac-
tice that causes a disparate impact."53 Congress, however, mollified
this creation of Wards Cove by allowing the employer's decision-
making process to be analyzed as one employment practice when
that process is not capable of separation for analysis.5
Congress also returned the burden of proving 'Job-relatedness"
and "business necessity" to the employer." Although Congress ab-
stained from defining this burden, the Interpretive Memorandum
accompanying the CRA provides that the "terms 'business necessity'
and 'job related' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by
the Supreme Court in [ Griggs] and in other Supreme Court decisions
prior to [Wards Cove] ."56 Congress remained silent on the continuing
relevance of Wards Cove outside of Title VII and on the propriety of
using disparate impact analysis in ADEA cases at all.
C. Re-Thinking Disparate Impact Analysis Under the ADEA: Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins
Despite the congressional silence in the CRA, courts continued to
apply disparate impact analysis to ADEA cases57 until the Supreme
49. Id. at 657.
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id.
52. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (determining that legislation is needed to provide
additional protection against unlawful employment discrimination because the Supreme Court
weakened the scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights protection in Wards Cove).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
54. Seeid. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
55. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(k)(1)(A)(i).
56. 137 CONG. REc. S15273-01, S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (introducing CRA and
accompanying interpretive memorandum).
57. See, e.g., Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.4 (7th Cir.
1992) (noting the CRA's codification of disparate impact analysis for Title VII cases, but still
permitting plaintiffs to sue for disparate impact under ADEA); Maresco v. Evans Chemetics,
964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the disparate impact doctrine was applicable to
ADEA cases but finding that theory did not "provide[] any significant analytical contribution in
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Court's 1993 decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins." Although a dis-
parate treatment case under the ADEA, the opinion in Hazen Paper
contained dicta about the purpose of the ADEA,5 causing some
courts to reconsider the use of disparate impact analysis.
Other than a damages issue not relevant to this discussion, the
question before the Court in Hazen Paper was whether an employer's
interference with the vesting of an employee's pension benefits vio-
lated the ADEA. 6° The Court answered this question in the negative
on the facts before it, observing that Hazen Paper's pension plan had
only a ten-year vesting period, and therefore, under that plan, "an
employee's age [was] analytically distinct from his years of service .....
[so that] a decision based on years of service [was not] necessarily
age-based."6' The company could take account of the plaintiffs years
of service while ignoring his age.62
In dicta, the Court also observed that "[d]isparate treatment cap-
tures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA,"6
and that it "is the very essence of age discrimination for an older em-
ployee to be fired because the employer believes that productivity
and competence decline with old age."' For the Court, when the
employer's decision is "wholly motivated by factors other than age
[such as pension status], the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes disappears."6
Several courts have relied on this dicta to preclude ADEA claims
premised on a disparate impact theory.66 These courts have taken
what the Supreme Court characterized as the "essence" of the
ADEA's prohibitions, intentional discrimination, and molded it into
the exclusive prohibition of the ADEA.67 Consistent with such an ap-
this case").
58. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
59. See id. at 610-11 (stating in dicta that ADEA's purpose is to prevent employers reliance
on inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes and that when an employer's decision is motivated
by factors other than age these stereotypes disappear). Additionally, Justices Rehnquist, Ken-
nedy and Thomas wrote separately to note that "there are substantial arguments that it is im-
proper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Titie VII to the ADEA." Id. at 618
(concurring opinion).
60. See id. at 608.
61. Id. at 611.
62. Id. (implying that an employer can factor in years of service while disregarding age).
63. Id. at 610.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 611.
66. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008-09 (10th Cir.) (inferring that
Supreme Court in Hazen Paper suggested that the ADEA does not encompass disparate impact
claims), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245 (1996); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-
77 (7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that claims based on disparate impact should not be brought un-
der ADEA).
67. See Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008-09 (indicating that Hazen Paper Court in dicta stated that
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proach, these courts have reasoned that when an employer discrimi-
nates unintentionally through a neutral policy or practice, it has not
acted upon an age stereotype, and therefore, a disparate impact the-
ory is not cognizable under the ADEA.6 Some of these courts have
buttressed this conclusion with the fact that Congress had the oppor-
tunity to, but refrained from, explicitly codifying disparate impact
analysis into the CRA in 1991.6
Part III of this Article addresses the merits of these decisions,
which involved claims under section 4 of the ADEA. Moreover, as
Part II discusses these decisions have limited application to disparate
impact challenges brought by federal employees, since the federal-
sector provision of the ADEA, section 15, is entirely distinct from the
language and history of section 4.
II. FEDERAL-SECTOR ADEA CLAIMS PREMISED ON DISPARATE IMPACT
ANALYSIS
A. The Distinctiveness of the Federal-Sector Provisions of the ADEA
Section 15(a) of the ADEA provides that all personnel actions af-
fecting most federal employees who are at least forty years of age
"shall be made free from any discrimination based on age."70 This
succinct prohibition is worded very differently from the prohibitions
contained in section 4, which apply only to private-sector and state
government employers, labor organizations, and employment agen-
cies.71
ADEA prohibits only intentional discrimination).
68. SeEllis, 73 F.3d at 1008-09 (ruling that it is improper to use disparate impact analysis if
employer's decisions are motivated by factors other than age); see also DiBiase v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating in dicta that no disparate impact
claims exist under ADEA); Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1076-77 (stating that employment
decisions based on criterion that merely tends to affect elderly workers are not prohibited and
should not fall under disparate impact theory).
69. See, e.g., Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (noting that Congress' addition of disparate impact lan-
guage into Title VII through the CRA, while refraining from such parallel provision in ADEA,
signaled Congress' intent not to allow for a disparate impact cause of action under ADEA).
70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (1994 & Supp. I
1995).
71. See29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)-(c), 630(b)-(d) (defining unlawful age discrimination practices
by private sector and state government employers, labor organization and employment agen-
cies). Among other things, section 4 makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with [the ADEA].
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Moreover, section 4 contains several exceptions to age discrimina-
tion that do not appear in section 15. n  For instance, section 4(f)
provides that a private employer does not commit age discrimination
when (1) it relies on age as "a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness"7 (the "BFOQ" exception), (2) it differentiates "based on rea-
sonable factors other than age"74 (the "RFOA" exception), (3) the
employee is working in a foreign workplace and compliance with the
ADEA would violate foreign law (the "foreign workplace" excep-
tion),T" (4) it observes the terms of a bona fide seniority system or a
bona fide employee benefit plan that is not intended to evade the
purposes of the ADEA,7 or (5) it discharges or otherwise disciplines
an individual for good cause. Although section 15 ostensibly makes
the BFOQ exception a defense to age discrimination in federal em-
ployment, a federal employer can invoke that defense only if the
EEOC first establishes "a maximum age requirement on the basis of a
determination that age is a bona fide occupational qualification nec-
essary to the performance of the duties of the position."78 To date,
the EEOC has established no such exemptions.7 Accordingly, the
ADEA essentially provides no exception to age discrimination by the
federal government, in sharp contrast to the private sector.s°
It is beyond cavil that section 4's exceptions cannot be read into
section 15, as ADEA section 15(f) explicitly requires that the two sec-
tions be construed separately."' Consistent with the statutory text, the
Supreme Court has held that section 15 is "self-contained and unaf-
fected by other sections, including those governing procedures ap-
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
72. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 633a, with 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1)-(3).
73. See29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. § 623(f)(2).
77. See id. § 623(0 (3).
78. See id. § 633a(b).
79. See29 C.F.R. § 1614.201(b) (1997).
80. Other provisions of federal law may impose a mandatory retirement age for certain
federal employees. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 4052 (1994) (requiring that Foreign Service workers
generally must retire at age 65). Such a requirement has been held not to violate the ADEA.
See Strawberry v. Albright, 111 F.3d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (ruling that mandatory retirement
provisions do not violate the ADEA), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1164 (1998); cf. Johnson v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353, 370 (1985) (holding that court could not validate a city's mandatory
retirement age for fire fighters by relying on a federal civil service statute that provided for
mandatory retirement for federal fire fighters at age 55).
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(f) (indicating that the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 631(b) and 633a
are the only sections of the ADEA that could possibly affect federal personnel actions). Section
631 (b) is irrelevant here because it merely limits the prohibitions contained in section 633a
(section 15) to individuals who are at least 40 years of age. See id. § 631 (b).
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plicable in actions against private employers." 2 Thus, to be consis-
tent with the legislative history of the ADEA Amendments of 1978,
which added section 1 5 (f)," section 15 must be construed on its own
terms, without reference to the various exceptions and unique statu-
tory language contained in the private-sector provisions of the
ADEA.8
4
B. The Crucial Link Between Section 15 of the ADEA and Section 717 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
In Lehman v. Nakshian, the Supreme Court held in no uncertain
terms that Congress patterned section 15 directly after the federal-
sector, anti-discrimination provision contained in section 717 of Title
VII.' The Court further noted that Senator Bentsen, the principal
sponsor of the bill that ultimately became section 15, "acknowledged
that '[t]he measures used to protect Federal employees [from age
discrimination] would be substantially similar to those incorporated'
in recently enacted amendments to Title VII."'  It is no surprise,
therefore, that other than the protected classes specified in the two
statutes, the prohibitory language contained in section 717 of Title
VII and section 15 of the ADEA is worded identically.87 Accordingly,
a court's construction of section 15 should be consistent with its con-
struction of section 7 17 .ss
82. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168 (1980); accord Tomasello v. Rubin, 920 F.
Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1996) ("The Supreme Court has concluded that this section is to be inter-
preted as 'federal actions covered by [29 U.S.C. § 633a] are not subject to any other section of
the ADEA.'") (alteration in original) (quoting Lehman, 453 U.S. at 167)); Koslow v. Hundt, 919
F. Supp. 18, 20 (D.D.C. 1995) ("Congress has made clear that in interpreting section 633a, the
Court may not borrow provisions from elsewhere in the ADEA."); Moysey v. Andrus, 481 F.
Supp. 850, 853-54 (D.D.C. 1979) (discussing legislative history behind section 15 and indicating
that it is an independent section).
83. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 5,92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 633a (1994 & Supp. 11995)).
84. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-415, at 11 (1977) (noting that restrictions and limitations in other
parts of the ADEA, such as paragraph (f) of section 4, do not apply to section 15).
85. See Lehman, 453 U.S. at 163-64 ("[Sections] 15(a) and (b) are patterned after §§ 717(a)
and (b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which extend the protection of Title VII to federal em-
ployees.") (citation omitted); id. at 167 n.15 ("Sections 15(a) and (b) of the ADEA, as offered
by Senator Bentsen and as finally enacted, are patterned directly after §§ 717(a) and (b) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which extend Title VII protections to federal employees.") (citation
omitted); id. at 166-67 ("Congress deliberately prescribed a distinct statutory scheme applicable
only to the federal sector [section 15], and one based... on Title VII.").
86. Id. at 167 n.15 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 24,397 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bentsen)).
87. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) [Title VII (1994 & Supp. 11995) ("All personnel ac-
tions affecting employees or applicants for employment.., shall be made free from any dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."), with 29 U.S.C. § 633a
[section 15] (1994 & Supp. 1 1995) ("All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants
for employment who are at least 40 years of age... shall be made free from any discrimination
based on age.").
88. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) ("Since the ADEA and
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Courts repeatedly have utilized disparate impact analysis in Title
VII cases against the federal government, and several explicitly have
held that the 1972 amendments to Title VII which created section
717 necessitate the application of Griggs to federal employment."
These decisions are buttressed by the legislative history of the Title
VII amendments which shows that Congress intended disparate im-
pact analysis to apply in cases against the federal government." As
Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, since
the language of section 14(b) [of the ADEA] is almost in haec verba with § 706(c) [of Title VII],
and since the legislative history of 14(b) indicates that its source was § 706(c), we may properly
conclude that Congress intended that the construction of § 14(b) should follow that of §
706(c)."). Despite the identical wording of the two statutes, one district court has declined to
look to section 717 of Title VII to imply a retaliation claim for federal employees under section
15 of the ADEA. See Koslow v. Hundt, 919 F. Supp. 18, 20 (D.D.C. 1995) (deciding not to look
at Title VII provision with regard to retaliation claims under section 15 because, unlike section
15, Title VII does not include an exclusivity provision). It does not follow, however, that judi-
cial constructions of section 15 generally should not follow constructions of section 717 of Title
VII. The decision in Koslow was premised on the unique facts that (1)section 15 does not ex-
plicitly bar retaliation, unlike section 4(d), which explicitly bars retaliation by private employ-
ers, and (2)section 15(f) precludes a court from borrowing other provisions of the ADEA when
interpreting section 15. See id. at 20-21. In contrast to the ADEA's prohibition against retalia-
tion, no section of the ADEA explicitly addresses the availability of disparate impact analysis, so
there is no possibility of impermissible borrowing in contravention of section 15(0. Therefore,
to determine whether section 15 encompasses disparate impact analysis, courts necessarily must
refer to the relevant legislative history regarding the meaning of the phrase "discrimination
based on age." This history shows not only that Congress was targeting facially-neutral, age-
discriminatory employment practices, see infra Part II.D, but also that, in the words of the Su-
preme Court, section 15 was "patterned directly after" section 717 of Title VII. See Lehman, 453
U.S. at 167 n.15.
Furthermore, the merits of the Koslow decision are questionable because federal-sector em-
ployees seem to be protected from retaliation for exercising their rights under the ADEA. See5
U.S.C. § 2302(1) (B) (1994) (prohibiting age discrimination in executive agencies and in the
Government Printing Office); id. § 2302(b) (9) (A)-(B) (prohibiting reprisal against federal
employees for their exercising "any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law,
rule, or regulation" or for their "testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in
the exercise" of such a right).
89. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 249-52 & n.15 (1976) (applying Griggs to the
federal government and noting that the federal government had argued it was subject to dispa-
rate impact analysis); Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818, 821 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(stating, in a sex-discrimination disparate impact case against the Veterans Administration, that
"[a]lthough Griggs dealt with the practices of a private employer, in light of the 1972 amend-
ments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, extending the provisions of that Act to government
employees, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, job qualifications for federal positions must also be meas-
ured under the Griggs standard"); see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,
586 n.7 (1983) (plurality opinion) (noting in disparate impact class action against a local gov-
ernment entity that the "District Court correctly relied on Griggs... and its progeny, as the
framework for its Title VII disparate impact analysis"); United States v. Virginia, 620 F.2d 1018,
1023 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Title VII applies the Griggs impact standard to both public and private
employees."); Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[P]roof of inten-
tional discrimination is not essential to recovery in a Title VII action even when the employer is
a governmental agency."); Matthews v. Runyon, 860 F. Supp. 1347, 1354-59 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
(applying disparate impact analysis to race discrimination claim against the U.S. Postal Service);
Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147, 1160-65 (D.D.C. 1979) (applying Griggs standard to
practices of Government Printing Office), affd in relevant part sub nom. Thompson v. Sawyer,
678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
90. See S. REP. No. 92-415, at 14-15 (1971) ("[T]he Committee expects the Civil Service
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discussed in Part II.D, below, Congress expressed the same intent for
ADEA section 15, which like section 717 of Title VII, was enacted well
after the Supreme Court's decision in Grggs. Therefore, to be con-
sistent, disparate impact analysis should be utilized under section
717's sister provision, ADEA's section 15.9'
C. The Consistent Application of Disparate Impact Analysis in ADEA
Lawsuits Against the Federal Government
Although reported cases are few in number, the lower courts have
applied disparate impact analysis in age discrimination cases against
the federal government.9 Only one of those courts, however, has
rigorously examined why disparate impact analysis is appropriate un-
der section 15.
In Lumpkin v. Brown,93 six contract specialists with the Veterans Af-
fairs Department sued the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under a dis-
parate im pact theory of age discrimination, challenging various selec-
tion criteria the Secretary had used for promotions.4 The Secretary
moved to dismiss based upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC
Commission to undertake a thorough re-examination of its entire testing and qualification
program to ensure that the standards enunciated in the Griggs case are fully met."); H.R. REP.
No. 92-238, at 24 (1971) (observing that Civil Service selection and promotion requirements
are "replete with artificial selection and promotion requirements that place a premium on
'paper' credentials which frequently prove of questionable value as a means of predicting ac-
tual job performance").
91. Cf Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294 n.11 (1985) (citations omitted) ("Thus,
when Congress in 1973 adopted virtually the same language for [section] 504 [of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973] that had been used in Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], Congress
was well aware ... that similar language in Title VI consistently had been interpreted to reach
disparate-impact discrimination. In refusing expressly to limit section 504 to intentional dis-
crimination, Congress could be thought to have approved a disparate-impact standard for sec-
tion 504."); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("[Where.. .Congress adopts a
new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the
new statute.")
92. See Lujan v. Walters, 813 F.2d 1051, 1057 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying ADEA disparate
impact analysis against federal government); Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 536-39 (9th
Cir. 1986) (stating that disparate impact analysis applies to ADEA claims, but affirming sum-
mary judgment for the employer); Lumpkin v. Brown, 898 F. Supp. 1263, 1270-71 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (holding that disparate impact doctrine applies to ADEA claims against the federal gov-
ernment); Klein v. Secretary of Transp., 807 F. Supp. 1517, 1522 (E.D. Wash. 1992)
(contrasting disparate treatment theory of recovery under ADEA with disparate impact theory
and choosing latter as appropriate to facts of case).
In Arnold v. United States Postal Senvice 649 F. Supp. 676 (D.D.C. 1986), the late judge Richey
held that disparate impact analysis could be applied in an ADEA case against the federal gov-
ernment. See id. at 681. On appeal, after the trial of the claims, the D.C. Circuit declined to
decide the issue, disposing of the case on other grounds. See Arnold v. United States Postal
Serv., 863 F.2d 994,998 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
93. 898 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
94. See id. at 1267-69 (alleging that noncompetitive promotions of recent college graduates
for "contract specialist" positions violated section 633a's prohibition against age discrimina-
tion).
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v. Francis W. Parker School, 95 a decision which foreclosed the use of a
disparate impact theory under ADEA's section 4.9
In its reasoning, the Lumpkin court began by stating that while sev-
eral circuits have recognized a disparate impact theory vis-a-vis private
employers, they have not been without criticism from other courts
and commentators.97 The court then observed that critics of dispa-
rate impact, including the district court's own circuit, base their criti-
cisms on (1) the "reasonable factors other than age" exception con-
tained in section 4(f) (1) of the ADEA, (2) the fact that section 4(f)
does not, on its face, refer to "applicants for employment" (unlike Ti-
tle VII's private-sector prohibition on discrimination), and (3) dicta
from Hazen Paper, a disparate treatment case under section 4.,98
The district court, however, found a crucial "twist" in the case be-
fore it: the plaintiffs were seeking relief under section 15, not section
4." Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Lehman, the court con-
cluded that section 15 is wholly distinct from section 4, and therefore
none of the reasons precluding disparate impact analysis applied.,°
Specifically, the court observed that (1) section 15 contains no
"reasonable factor other than age" exception, (2) section 15 explic-
itly applies to "applicants for employment," and (3) because Hazen
Paper was a disparate treatment case brought under section 4, it can-
not be viewed as having considered the very different situation of
disparate impact under section 15.1" As section 15 was enacted three
years after Griggs was decided, the court held that the Seventh Circuit
would still utilize disparate impact analysis under section 15, notwith-
standing its contrary view concerning section 4.102
The Lumpkin court's analysis is sound, as far as it goes. To buttress
its holding, however, the court also could have noted section 15's
95. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994).
96. See id. at 1077 (affirming summary judgment on ADEA claim premised on disparate
impact theory because "decisions based on criteria which merely tend to affect workers over
the age of forty more adversely than workers under forty are not prohibited") (citation omit-
ted).
97. See Lumpkin, 898 F. Supp. at 1270-71 (noting criticism against importing disparate im-
pact analysis into the ADEA).
98. See id. at 1270-71. The merits of the arguments against the use of disparate impact
analysis for section 4 claims are addressed below in Part III.
99. See id. at 1271 (asserting that section 15 "contains no textual counterpart" to section 4
and "by its terms it is the exclusive prohibition against age discrimination within the federal
government").
100. See id. (quoting Lehman which stated that section 15 is both "self-contained" and
"unaffected by other sections, including those governing procedures applicable in actions
against private employers").
101. See id. (concluding that for these three reasons "[w]e are thus left largely without com-
pass from our Court of Appeals on the issue of disparate impact as to federal employees")
102. See id. (suggesting that since section 15 was enacted after Griggs, it incorporated the
disparate impact theory).
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parallel with section 717 of Title VII and, as discussed below, section
15's legislative history.
D. The Legislative Histoy of Section 15 of the ADEA
The origins of section 15 of the ADEA can be traced as far back as
March 9, 1972, when Senator Bentsen introduced Senate Bill 3318
before the 92nd Congress."3 Senate Bill 3318 was created to subject
federal, state, and local governments to the provisions of the ADEA.' 4
In support of the bill, Senator Bentsen noted that as a result of recent
government reductions in force ("RIF") orders issued by federal
agencies, older employees were "transferred repeatedly, denied their
right to 'bump' employees with less experience, or subject to veiled
hints that their usefulness [was] at an end."'05
On May 4, 1972, Senator Bentsen and three senate co-sponsors
submitted a new version of Senate Bill 3318 as an amendment to
Senate Bill 1861, which became the Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments ("FLSA") of 1972." 6 Similar to the present section 15, the
amended version of Senate Bill 3318 mandated that "[a]ll personnel
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment.., in ex-
ecutive agencies... shall be made free from any discrimination
based on age.' 0 7 The bill died, however, when the 1972 FLSA bill
failed to pass in the House for unrelated reasons."8
On January 31, 1973, citing a special study completed by the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Aging, entitled Cancelled Careers, Senator
Bentsen reintroduced his bill as Senate Bill 635.'09 In support of this
latest bill, the Senator observed that Cancelled Careers documented
"repeated instances of subtle and direct discrimination against Fed-
eral workers.""" His observation was correct.
The preface to Cancelled Careers, authored by Senator Frank
Church, Chairman of the Special Committee on Aging, and Senators
Jennings Randolph and Walter F. Mondale, proclaimed that "if man-
103. SeeS. 3318, 92d Cong. (1972); 118 CONG. REC. 7745 (1972) (introducing S. 3318); see
also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 167 n.14 (1980) (discussing legislative history of
ADEA).
104. See 118 CONG. REc. 7744 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
105. Id. at 7745.
106. See S. 3318, 92d Cong. (1972); 118 CONG. REc. 15,895 (1972) (introducing amended
version ofS. 3318).
107. 118 CONG. REc. 15,895.
108. See 119 CONG. REc. 2648 (1973) (repeating Senator Bentsen's presentation of the
amendment to the President and appealing to the nation that government employees deserve
same treatment as private employees; also noting that the amendment died along with the rest
of the FLSA bill due to disagreements concerning the proposed level of the minimum wage).
109. S.635,93rd Cong.(1973); 119 CONG. REC. 2648 (1973).
110. See 119 CONG. REC. 2648
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agement in Government is allowed to take arbitrary actions which, in
effect, cause 'cancelled careers,' it may pose a serious threat to well-
trained and conscientious employees and to the entire civil service
system."'.. The Senators then endorsed the report's specific findings
prepared by Elizabeth Heidbreder, of the National Council on the
Aging's Institute of Industrial Gerontology.12  According to them,
Heidbreder's findings provided "disturbing evidence" that substanti-
ated the impression that the federal government's RIF programs
were resulting in "dire consequences" for older workers and were
likely to be counterproductive. "3
These "dire consequences" stemmed, in part, from ostensibly age-
neutral RIF practices such as (1) cutting jobs at higher salary grade
levels and (2) strict limitations on competitive bumping areas. In
particular, Heidbreder found that "[t] hose in the higher grade slots
are particularly attractive targets [for RIF's] because the elimination
of their jobs would help reduce agency grade levels as directed by the
Office of Management and Budget." 4 Heidbreder also found that
agencies arbitrarily and artificially determined competitive areas and
job assignments where senior employees could "bump" or "retreat"
to during a RIF, resulting in an adverse impact on older federal
workers."'
5
She cited numerous examples of agencies artificially reducing ar-
eas of competition to extremely small units in which there are no al-
ternate positions available to employees with the highest retention
categories, namely, those with the most seniority.
6
111. ELIZABETH M. HEIDBREDER, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE AGING'S INSTITUTE OF IN-
DUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY, 92D CONG., CANCELLED CAREERS, THE IMPACT OF REDUCTION-IN-FORCE
POLICIES ON MIDDLE-AGED FEDERAL EMPLOYEES III (Comm. Print 1972).
112. See id. (presenting Heidbreder's studies that were specifically conducted to bolster
findings of report).
113. See id. at IV (noting early retirees have increased financial burdens relating to home
and family but age may bar retiree from obtaining second career to supplement annuity).
114. Id. at 8; see also id. at 1 (finding that"[e]arly retirement and layoff of middle-aged Fed-
eral employees [were] being caused by management directives to cut jobs and grades").
115. See id. at 1 ("[C]ompetitive areas may be so narrowly defined that in effect employees
have no one against whom they can compete and their rights to jobs held by employees with
lower retention ratings evaporate."); id. at 10 ("While employees with considerable Federal
service have job protection in that if their jobs are abolished they are supposed to be able to
'bump' other employees in similar jobs with less seniority or 'retreat' to a lesser graded posi-
tion, there are always ways for overzealous supervisors to circumvent rules or harass subordi-
nates. One way is to strictly limit the competitive bumping area with the result that there is no
one to bump.").
116. See id. at 22-24 & app. 5 at 43 (finding that NASA had established 1381 competitive lev-
els for 1830 aerospace scientists at Goddard Space Flight Center, effectively eliminating veter-
ans' preference and seniority as factors in retention, and also citing a report which had docu-
mented the "booby trap" in a new job classification and evaluation system being developed by
the Civil Service System with regard to the competitive levels used in RIF's).
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Thus, intentional discrimination, such as age limitations on train-
ing programs and agencies' desire to have a younger work force, was
not the only major impetus for Senator Bentsen's bill barring age
discrimination in federal employment. The bill also relied on sig-
nificant evidence that certain ostensibly-neutral polices, such as tar-
geting higher grade levels and hyper-definition of competitive areas,
were "arbitrary actions" that amounted to subtle discrimination hav-
ing "dire consequences" for older federal workers.'17 These are the
same types of concerns that the Supreme Court has held motivated
the enactment of Title VII and necessitated the application of dispa-
rate impact analysis under that statute."'
In the second session of the 93d Congress,"9 Senator Bentsen's
new bill barring age discrimination in federal employment was
folded into Senate Bill 2747, the Fair Labor Standard Amendments
of 1974.2 Senator Church invoked the Cancelled Careers report as a
justification for passing the bill. 2' In passing Senate Bill 2 7 4 7 ,I2 the
Senate enacted section 15 of the ADEA which, for the first time, re-
quired all federal government personnel actions to be "free from any
discrimination based on age." ''t As discussed above, the legislative
history strongly suggests that this broad statutory prohibition is in-
tended to encompass age-based barriers to employment caused by
both disparate treatment and disparate impact.
24
117. See id. at III-IV.
118. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1970) (noting that"Congress di-
rected the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the mo-
tivation" and observing that adverse impact analysis is necessary to eliminate "artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discrimi-
nate") (second emphasis added).
119. Although Senate Bill 635, and Senator Church's complementary bill, Senate Bill 1810,
passed without objection as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1973,
it was dropped in conference because of the House germaneness rule. See 119 CONG. REC.
28,644, 32,959 (1973). Senator Bentsen reintroduced his bill in the form of Senate Bill 2380
on September 6, 1973. See S. 2380, 93d Cong. (1973); 119 CONG. REc. 28,644-45 (1973)
(introducing S. 2380). Senator Bentsen again cited CANCELLED CAREERS in support of his bill.
See 119 CONG. REC. 28,644.
120. See 120 CONG. REC. 4706 (1974).
121. Seeid.at4707.
122. See 120 CONG. REC. 8769 (1974).
123. See Fair Labor Stanaard Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 15, 28(b) (2), 88
Stat. 55, 79-80 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)
(emphasis added).
124. Although section 15 finally afforded older federal employees a remedy for uninten-
tional employment discrimination, the federal government has had a policy against facially-
neutral, non-job-related barriers to the employment of older persons since the early 1960's. In
1963, President Kennedy issued a memorandum for the heads of executive departments and
agencies which stated, among other things,
[I] t is the policy of the Federal Government as an employer to evaluate each job ap-
plicant on the basis of ability, not age .... Personnel actions should be based, in ac-
cordance with merit principles, solely on the ability of candidates to meet qualification re-
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E. Confronting a Claim of Sovereign Immunity
Governmental immunity, otherwise known as sovereign immunity,
is an ancient common law principle that protects governments at all
levels from liability for legal actions.' 25 Although a government may
consent to be sued,'26 any waiver of the federal government's immu-
nity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text,2 7 will not be
implied,'2 8 and will be strictly construed, in terms of scope, in favor of
the sovereign.'2
Several Supreme CourtJustices have noted that the concept of dis-
crimination is "susceptible of varying interpretations. ' "3 Faced with a
disparate impact ADEA claim, a federal government defendant might
argue such ambiguity shows that Congress has not unequivocally
waived sovereign immunity for disparate impact liability,'3 ' and there-
fore, that Congress must codify disparate impact analysis into ADEA
section 15 before it can apply to the federal government.
Such an argument would prove too much. If the term
"discriminate" is ambiguous for purposes of sovereign immunity law,
then it is ambiguous as to all interpretations of the term, including
the interpretation that it denotes intentional discrimination. This
conclusion would directly conflict with the Supreme Court's repeated
pronouncements that Congress has waived the government's immu-
nity from claims of age-based employment discrimination.'12
quirements and physical standards of the position to be filled.
President's Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 14, 1963), re-
printed in Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 n.1 (1964-65) (emphasis added). President
Johnson cited the memorandum in Executive Order 11,141 which extended the anti-age dis-
crimination policy to federal contractors and subcontractors. See id. at 179-80.
Moreover, the federal government itself has argued that it has adhered to a policy of job-
related employment standards since the 19th century. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
249 n.15 (1976) (reciting government's argument to lower court: "In Griggs, the Supreme
Court set a job-relationship standard for the private sector employers which has been a stan-
dard for federal employment since the passage of the Civil Service Act in 1883.").
125. SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER& KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1033
(5th ed. 1984).
126. See id.
127. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
503 U.S. 30,33-34 (1992)).
128. See id. (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,95 (1990)).
129. See id. (citing United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995));see also Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1980) (holding that federal employees suing under section 15
of the ADEA are not entitled to ajury trial on their claims because Congress did not affirma-
tively and unambiguously grant that right by statute).
130. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (Powell, J.) (plurality
opinion); accord Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983) (White, J.)
(plurality opinion) ("[Tihe word 'discrimination' is inherently [ambiguous].").
131. See, e.g., Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 37 (holding that the existence of multiple plausible
readings of a statute establishes that "a reading imposing monetary liability on the Government
is not 'unambiguous'" for purposes of waiving sovereign immunity).
132. See Lehman, 453 U.S. at 160 (restating the Court's recognition that Congress has waived
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Inevitably, any argument over sovereign immunity really is a debate
over the proper way to construe the statutory term "discrimination."
If Title VII jurisprudence is instructive, then the Supreme Court al-
ready has settled this debate by holding that discrimination based on
disparate impact and discrimination based on disparate treatment
constitute the identical legal animal. As the Court explained:
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically
dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the ultimate
legal issue is different than in cases where disparate treatment
analysis is used.... Rather, the necessary premise of the disparate
impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted with-
out a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be func-
tionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.
Accordingly, disparate treatment and disparate impact arguably
represent just two different analytical routes to (or theories of proof
for) the same legal conclusion-the presence or absence of employ-
ment discrimination. 3 4 If so, sovereign immunity law should not re-
quire the sovereign's explicit consent to the particular theory of li-
ability a discrimination plaintiff might choose to invoke. In fact, the
federal government itself recently argued this very point in Reynolds
v. Alabama Department of Transportation.
In Reynolds, the defendant state agencies asserted sovereign immu-
nity from the plaintiffs' disparate impact race discrimination claim
brought pursuant to Title VIIis The state defendants argued that
the government's immunity from suits brought pursuant to ADEA); see also EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 233 n.5 (1983) ("[Congress] extended the Act to cover federal workers by enact-
ing a separate provision ... which created an independent enforcement mechanism under the
jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.").
133. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted).
134. See id. at 990 (referring to "disparate impact analysis"); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 507 U.S. 604, 618 (1993) (Kennedy, J.,Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(referring to "disparate impact analysis"); see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
583 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Where the Title VII claim is that a facially neutral em-
ployment practice actually falls more harshly on one racial group, thus having a disparate im-
pact on that group, our cases establish a dfferent way of proving the claim.") (emphasis added).
135. 4 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
136. Id. at 1094 (claiming that it would violate the Eleventh Amendment to impose dispa-
rate impact liability on states). In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Supreme
Court articulated a two-part test for determining whether federal law violates a state entity's
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 55-56. First, "Congress' intent to
abrogate the States' immunity from suit must be obvious from a clear legislative statement and
must be expressed in unequivocal statutory language." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Sec-
ond, the federal law at issue must have been passed "pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Id.
at 55. The test for the federal government's sovereign immunity only requires satisfaction of
the first part of the Seminole Tribe test. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (holding that
a waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity must "appear clearly in... statutory
text" and must be unequivocally expressed therein).
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the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which for the first time authorized
suits against the states, "did not provide a sufficiently 'unequivocal
expression' of [congressional] intent to impose liability on the States
for disparate-impact discrimination, because this disparate-impact li-
ability was a :judicially-created theory' that was neither the product of
Congressional decision-making nor explicitly mentioned in the 1972
amendments.' ' 37 While the agencies conceded that the Supreme
Court had held in Fitzpatrick v. BitzeP that the 1972 amendments val-
idly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity against Title VII suits,
they nevertheless contended that the amendments did not contain "a
sufficiently clear statement of [Congress'] intent to abrogate the
States' immunity specifically as to claims grounded on a disparate-
impact theory of discrimination."' 9
The district court rejected the sovereign immunity defense, instead
relying upon the arguments advanced by the Justice Department on
behalf of the United States. The court held:
As the United States correctly observes, the defendants have failed in
their attempt to establish that the 'unequivocal expression' re-
quirement demands more than a clear expression by Congress of
its intent to abrogate the States' immunity as to a statute as a whole,
that is, also compels Congress to indicate explicitly that its abroga-
don is meant to encompass claims against States brought pursuant
to all potential theories of liability available under the statute.140
Indeed, the court's opinion echoed the very words contained in
the Justice Department's brief. There, the United States argued:
Defendants can cite no authority for the assertion that it is insuffi-
cient that Congress clearly state its intent to abrogate the States'
immunity from claims under a statute as a whole, but rather must
separately and specifically state its intent to abrogate with respect to
every theory of liability arising under the statute. In fact, that is
simply not the law.141
The Reynolds court further held that, "assum[ing] for the sake of
argument that Congress must unequivocally state its intent to abro-
gate as to specific liability theories, there is ample support for a con-
clusion that such a requirement would be satisfied.... "" The
137. Reynolds, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
138. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
139. Reynolds, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
140. Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).
141. United States' Memorandum in Response to Reynolds Defendants' and Adams Inter-
venors' Motions to Dismiss Disparate Impact Claims, at C-7, Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't. of
Transp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (on file with the American University Law Review)
[hereinafter United States' Mem.].
142. Reynolds, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
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court's reasoning was two-fold. First, in the Fitzpatrick decision, where
the Supreme Court held that Congress had waived the state's sover-
eign immunity under Title VII, the Court made no reference to a
specific theory or theories of liability, but rather, to "general-
applicability provision[s] pertaining to the definition of terms em-
ployed in the statute or the scope of the right to sue under Title
VII. '"' Second, the theory of disparate impact liability "was not judi-
cially created in 1971 [through Griggs] but rather was a product of
statutory construction of what the law is, and was at the time of pas-
sage, and, most importantly, prior to the extension of Title VII to the
States with 1972 amendments."'"
These reasons apply equally as well to ADEA's section 15. First,
when the Supreme Court announced that Congress had waived the
federal government's sovereign immunity for ADEA claims, it made
no reference to theories of liability, but rather to section 15's general
prohibition against age discrimination in federal employment and to
section 15 (c), which authorizes civil actions in federal district court.4 5
Second, disparate impact analysis under the ADEA is not a judicial
creation, but an explanation of what section 15 is and was at the time
of its passage based on its legislative history4 6 and its interconnection
with the statutory language applying Title VII to the federal govern-
ment."7 Thus, ADEA disparate impact liability does not run afoul of
the government's sovereign immunity under the rationale of the Rey-
nolds court.
Moreover, requiring Congress to codify a mode of proving the le-
gal harm of discrimination into the United States Code before it can
be applied against the federal government might preclude applica-
tion of some of the most fundamental procedural rules in employ-
ment discrimination law to federal discrimination claims, such as the
three-step approach for proving disparate treatment with circumstan-
tial evidence, mixed-motives analysis, and hostile work environment
analysis."' Such a requirement would also preclude Title VII dispa-
rate impact claims against the federal government because the fed-
eral employment provision of Title VII does not expressly impose
disparate impact liability.' This result, however, would plainly con-
143. Id. at 1097-98 (referring back to analysis in Fitzpatrick).
144. Id. at 1098 (emphasis in original) (citing Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509
U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (ScaliaJ., concurring)).
145. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 162 (1980).
146. See supra Part II.D.
147. See supra Part II.B.
148. See supra Part LA.
149. Indeed, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it codified disparate impact
language only into the non-federal employment provisions of Tite VII. See infra Part III.G.
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flict with Supreme Court precedent, and the federal government's
own litigation position, that disparate impact analysis does apply to a
federal government employer sued under Title VII. ° A far less dis-
ruptive result would be to treat disparate impact analysis just like
other methods of proof in discrimination law, that is, not as discrete
"claims," but as different ways to prove the same legal harm-
employment discrimination.'5'
III. DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE ADEA
As argued in Part II, the statutory language of ADEA section 15, its
distinctiveness from section 4, its direct parallel with section 717 of
Title VII, the uniformity of court decisions applying disparate impact
analysis under both section 717 and section 15, and the legislative
history of section 15, all support the conclusion that disparate impact
analysis applies in ADEA claims against the federal government. The
purported impropriety of disparate impact analysis under ADEA sec-
tion 4 should not alter this conclusion.' Nevertheless, assuming that
judicial interpretations of section 4 are relevant to this discussion,
this Part argues that some form of disparate impact is appropriate
under section 4, notwithstanding some recent court of appeals deci-
sions to the contrary.
The First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and District of Co-
150. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (refusing to permit a rule whereby
discrimination claims brought against the government under the Fifth Amendment can be
premised on disparate impact analysis, because, in the Court's view, "extension of the rule be-
yond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employ-
ment, should await legislative prescription") (emphasis added); id. at 249 n.15 (noting that fed-
eral government had taken position that it was bound by standards announced in Griggs).
151. To further illustrate this point, an analogy could be drawn to the government's waiver
of immunity through the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). The FTCA waives the govern-
ment's immunity for "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Gov-
ernment while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1)
(1994). State law governs how a negligence claim is proved against the federal government.
See id. § 1346(b). Depending upon applicable state law, negligence can be proven in several
different ways. A plaintiff might take the typical route and attempt to prove: (1) a legal duty of
the defendant to protect others against unreasonable risks; (2) defendant's breach of that duty;
(3) that the plaintiffs injury was actually and legally caused by the defendant's breach of duty;
and (4) that as a result the plaintiff incurred damages. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 125,
§ 30, at 164-65. Alternatively, using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, he may try to prove that (1)
the injury-causing event was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of some-
one's negligence; (2) the event was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant; and (3) the event was not due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff. See id. § 39, at 244. Despite the different elements of proof for ares
ipsa loquitur theory of negligence, the federal government still may be held liable under this
type of analysis. See id. § 131, at 1034. By analogy, the government's waiver of immunity for
claims of age discrimination, as with claims of negligence under the FTCA, should not be con-
tingent upon the specific method of proof.
152. See supra Part IIA (discussing distinctiveness of section 15 and arguing that section 15
stands independently from section 4).
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lumbia Circuits all continue to apply or assume arguendo the applica-
bility of disparate impact analysis under section 4."5 The Seventh
and Tenth Circuits, however, have explicitly held that disparate im-
pact analysis cannot be invoked under ADEA section 4,"' and the
Third Circuit in dicta has expressed doubt about its availability.'55 As
argued below, these three circuits fail to address several significant
pieces of legislative history and misconstrue others that strongly sug-
gest Congress intended to prohibit certain age-discriminatory prac-
tices of private employers that are not necessarily based on age
stereotypes. Furthermore, these courts proffer other dubious reasons
to preclude disparate impact analysis under section 4, such as dicta
from the Supreme Court's Hazen Paper decision,'" an unpersuasive
comparison between the Equal Pay Act's "other factors other than
sex" exception and the ADEA's exception for differentiation based
on "reasonable factors other than age,'5 7 a flawed interpretation of
section 4's prohibition against discrimination "because of such indi-
vidual's age,"'5" and Congress's failure to add disparate impact lan-
guage to the ADEA when it passed the CRA."59 This Part concludes by
arguing that although ADEA disparate impact claims may pose
unique practical problems in certain factual settings, such problems
can be accommodated, and, in any event, do notjustify the wholesale
denial of a remedy for age discrimination.
A. Defining "Arbitrary" Age Discrimination
Section 2 of the ADEA, the congressional statement of findings
153. See Bramble v. American Postal Workers Union, 135 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1998)
(reiterating that no definitive interpretation of the applicability of disparate impact analysis
exists); Lewis v. Aerospace Community Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing the viability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA); District Council 37 v.
New York City Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 113 F.3d 347, 351-54 (2d Cir. 1997) (maintaining
applicability of such claims under ADEA); Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(assuming, without deciding, that disparate impact analysis is available); Mangold v. California
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1995) (indicating instances where the the-
ory should not apply); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139-40 n.5
(6th Cir. 1995) (casting some doubt on viability of theory, but still applying it); EEOC v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp., 999 F.2d 113, 116-17 (5th Cir. 1993) (maintaining applicability of such
claims under ADEA).
154. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir.) (rejecting plaintiff's reli-
ance on disparate impact theory), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245 (1996); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker
Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-78 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
155 See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995) (failing to
explicitly determine applicability of disparate impact analysis under ADEA).
156. See Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1073, 1076-77 (discussing the disparate treatment
claim in Hazen Paper).
157. See Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (comparing Equal Pay Act and ADEA language).
158. See DiBiase,48 F.3d at 724-25.
159. See Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (stating that Congress did not intend for ADEA to provide for
disparate impact analysis).
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and purpose, professes a congressional intent to prohibit "arbitrary"
age discrimination in employment.' In the course of rejecting dis-
parate impact liability under section 4 of the ADEA, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reached the questionable conclusion that "arbitrary" discrimina-
tion means intentional discrimination only.'
61
As noted in Part II.D above and by Professor Steven J. Kamin-
shine,' 62 one of the major reasons the Supreme Court fashioned dis-
parate impact analysis was its view that Congress had intended to re-
move "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate.... """ In pro-
hibiting arbitrary discrimination, section 2 of the ADEA is therefore
consistent with Griggs. Section 2 clearly manifests a congressional in-
tent that employers judge older workers on their true abilities, not by
arbitrary standards.'6 In addition, as discussed in Part III.B, below,
the principal impetus behind the 1967 Act, a report prepared at the
behest of Congress by the Secretary of Labor in 1965,"" explicitly in-
cludes ostensibly-neutral, age-discriminatory practices within the
definition of "arbitrary" age discrimination. Accordingly, the term
"arbitrary" discrimination can encompass more than intentional dis-
crimination.
In any event, the actual prohibitions contained in section 4 do not
contain the word "arbitrary."'6 Instead, except for minor variations,
section 4's prohibitory language mirrors that of section 703(a) (2) of
160. See29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
161. See Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (citing Hazen Paper in concluding that ADEA prohibits only
intentional discrimination and positing that to prevail, plaintiff must establish the pretextual
nature of defendant's proffered reasons for not hiring).
162. See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 291-92 (1990).
163. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1970) (emphasis added).
164. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 621 (b) (1994) ("It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to pro-
mote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age .... .");U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
(1965) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S REPORT] ("An unmeasured but significant proportion of the
age limitations presently in effect are arbitrary in the sense that they have been established
without any determination of their actual relevance to job requirements, and are defended on
grounds apparently different from their actual explanation.").
165. SeeSECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 164.
166. A prepared statement submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Labor by the Ameri-
can Association of Railroads ("AAR") during the hearings on the ADEA noted the significance
of the omission of the word "arbitrary" from the prohibitory provisions of the ADEA. See Age
Discrimination in Employment, 1967: Hearings on S. 830 & S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong. 320 (1967) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
The AAR pointed out that this omission was "a departure from the concept of eliminating only
'arbitrary' discrimination which is the concept set forth throughout" the Secretary of Labor's
1965 report, and therefore the AAR requested that the Senate bills barring age discrimination
be amended to prohibit only "arbitrary" discrimination. Seeid.
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Title VII, 167 which undoubtedly encompasses disparate impact liabil-
ity.'6 Consequently, the specific, prohibitory language contained in
section 4 should trump any contrary inference that may arise from
language in the findings and purpose section of the statute.
B. The Legislative History of Section 4 of the ADEA
As noted above, the Tenth Circuit has held that Congress did not
contemplate disparate impact analysis in ADEA cases against private
employers.' That court purports to rely on the principal piece of
167. Section 703(a) (2) of Title VII reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (1994).
Section 4(a) (2)of the ADEA reads: "It shall be unlawful for an employer.., to limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's age .... " 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2). This language is identical to that contained
in Title VII, except for the omission of "applicants for employment." It could be argued that, at
a minimum, this omission precludes disparate impact analysis for claims attacking application
or hiring procedures. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
But see id. at 1080 n.3 (arguing that there is authority holding that § 623(a) (2) protects appli-
cants from disparate impact, as does ADEA § 623(a) (1)). Alternatively, it could be argued that
any explicit reference to applicants is unnecessary, because the statute protects the employ-
ment opportunities of any "individual"-a general term that encompasses prospective, current
and former employees, as well as individuals who have no employment relationship with the
alleged discriminator. Cf Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (noting that "nowhere are there words of limitation that restrictreferences in [Title VII]
to 'any individual' as comprehending only an employee of an employer" and holding that re-
lief may be available "against respondents who are neither actual nor potential direct employ-
ers of particular complainants, but who control access to such employment and who deny such
access by reference to invidious criteria") (footnote omitted). This argument is consistent with
Department of Labor regulations from 1968 interpreting the ADEA to prohibit practices that
tend to adversely affect older applicants. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text
(discussing regulations related to physical fitness and educational standards).
168. See Gyiggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1 (noting that the Court had granted review to determine
whether section 703 (a) (2) encompasses disparate impact liability);see also Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 44648 (1982) (noting that Griggs had interpreted section 703(a) (2) to prohibit
disparate impact); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141 (1977) (same).
169. See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 176 (1989) ("In order
to determine the type of age discrimination that Congress sought to eliminate as arbitrary, we
must look for guidance to the substantive prohibitions of the Act itself, for these provide the
best evidence of the nature of the evils Congress sought to eradicate."), rev'd in part by statute, 29
U.S.C. § 623(0 (2) (1994); Bissette v. Colonial Mortgage Corp., 477 F.2d 1245, 1246 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (rejecting plaintiff's statutory interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 1601 based on the pur-
ported legislative goals of the statute because the "general section setting forth legislative goals
neither constitutes an operative section of the statute nor prevails over the specific provisions");
Samuels v. District of Columbia, 650 F. Supp. 482, 484 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that"the pre-
amble of the [Housing and Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983] is merely a general statement of
policy which does not mitigate and certainly does not override the specific requirements laid
out in the body of the statute") (footnote omitted) (citing Bissette, 477 F.2d at 1246-47).
170. SeeEllis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245
(1996).
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ADEA legislative history, a 1965 report on age discrimination in em-
ployment, entitled The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in
Employment ("Secretary's Report")." Congress commissioned the report
from then-Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz pursuant to Section
715 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."2
According to the Tenth Circuit, the Secretay's Report differentiates
between "'arbitrary discrimination' based on age (intentional dis-
crimination based on age stereotypes) and problems resulting from
factors that 'affect older workers more strongly, as a group, than they
do younger employees' (disparate impact)".' The Secretary's Report,
however, made no such distinction.
The report discusses numerous personnel programs and practices
that disproportionately affect older workers, although not developed
for this purpose, labeling them "institutional arrangements that indi-
rectly restrict the employment of older workers."' 74 It then explicitly
states that "individual circumstances may... lead to arbitrary dis-
crimination in the.., category... involving institutional arrange-
ments which operate indirectly to restrict the employment of older
workers."'75 Thus, the Tenth Circuit clearly misconstrued the Secre-
tary's definition of "arbitrary" discrimination. The indirect, institu-
tional forces may constitute "arbitrary" age discrimination, depending
upon the "individual circumstances" of the case.
The Tenth Circuit compounded its mistake by reasoning that the
Secretary's Report supposedly recommended only "programmatic
measures" to address such age-neutral institutional forces, and there-
fore the ADEA's statutory prohibitions fail to address them. 7 6 Both
the Secretary's Report and the language of the ADEA undermine the
court's reasoning.
The Secretary's Report provides several examples of institutional ar-
171. See id. (relying on the SECRETARY'S REPORT).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1994) Title VII required the Secretary of Labor to "make a full
and complete study of factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employment be-
cause of age and of the consequences of such discrimination on the economy and individuals
affected." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1994). The report was to include"such recommendations
for legislation to prevent arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age as he deter-
mines advisable." Id. Secretary Wirtz submitted the report in June 1965, along with a set of
research materials supporting the report. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN
WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE
CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, RESEARCH MATERIALS (1965)
[hereinafter RESEARCH MATERIALS].
173. See Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (highlighting the difference the SECRETARY'S REPORT purport-
edly draws between age discrimination and employment issues faced by older workers).
174. See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 164, at 15.
175. Id. at 5.
176. See Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008 (noting report's recommendation that programmatic meas-
ures be used to improve opportunities for older workers).
1100
1998] FEDERAL-SECTOR AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
rangements that operate against older workers: (1) "arbitrary" rules
and generalized hiring policies that "ignore individual differences"
and "deprive companies of talent and qualified workers of opportu-
nity;" (2) promotion-from-within policies that greatly benefit cur-
rently employed workers, but tend to restrict outside hiring to lower
wage entry levels; (3) seniority systems which protect older workers in
their jobs, but may result in layoffs of older workers if their seniority
units for layoff purposes are narrowly-defined; (4) workers' compen-
sation laws, liberally construed by courts to enable recovery for non-
job-related disabilities, that create employer reluctance to hire older
workers; and (5) private pension, health, and insurance plans that
provide security to the older worker, but which may make it more
costly to employ older workers at a benefit level comparable to
younger workers.'77 The report notes that these arrangements gener-
ally involve programs and practices designed to protect the employ-
ment of older workers and provide support for them when they retire
or become ill, and proffers recommendations for "adjust[ing]" ar-
rangements (3), (4), and (5) through programmatic measures. 78
Significantly, he suggested no programmatic measures for coping
with non-protective, arbitrary rules that lead to age discrimination.
Congress concurred with the Secretary's findings by noting in leg-
islation that "certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the
disadvantage of older persons."'' Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's
analysis, however, Congress did not rely, and through subsequent
amendments, has not relied, solely on "programmatic measures" to
remedy age discrimination caused by institutional arrangements. In-
stead, all of these institutional arrangements are dealt with in the
prohibitory portions of the ADEA.'s
Arbitrary employment rules and promotion-from-within policies
are addressed by ADEA section 4(f) (1), which permits a non-federal
employer to differentiate between employees "based on reasonable
factors other than age," also known as the RFOA exception.' 8' The
RFOA exception permits ostensibly-neutral employment rules and
practices that operate to the disadvantage of older workers, as long as
they are based on "reasonable" decision-making factors. The Secre-
tary's Report suggests that "arbitrary" rules and practices are not rea-
sonable, because they "deprive[] companies of talent and qualified
177. SeeSECRETARY's REPORT, supra note 164, at 15-17.
178. Id. at 2, 22 (discussing the need for policy initiatives in the areas of pensions, worker's
compensation, disability insurance, and seniority rights).
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (a) (2) (1994).
180. Seeid. 623(a)-(c).
181. See id. § 623(f)(1).
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workers of opportunity.' 8 2
Seniority systems fall within the scope of ADEA section 4(f) (2) (A),
which provides that observance of a bona fide seniority system not in-
tended to evade the purposes of the ADEA and that does not require
or permit involuntary early retirement does not violate the ADEA.'8 '
Section 4(f) (2) (A) embodies the understanding that seniority sys-
tems can operate to the disadvantage of older workers, but limits
employer liability to cases of intentional discrimination. 4 This limi-
tation is perfectly consistent with Title VII, under which plaintiffs
challenging a seniority system as discriminatory also are limited to a
disparate treatment theory of recovery. 5
It is unclear why Secretary Wirtz viewed the fourth arrangement
(discrimination based on perceived worker's compensation costs) to
be an age-neutral "institutional arrangement." This type of discrimi-
nation appears to be functionally equivalent to a policy of not hiring
people over a certain age (which Secretary Wirtz stated was not age-
neutral), because the employer would be acting upon a generalized
assumption about older workers, instead of considering the specific
circumstances and qualifications of the individual."* In any event,
recent Supreme Court precedent strongly suggests that intentionally
failing to hire an older worker because of a stereotyped belief that
increased age correlates with higher workers' compensation costs is
illegal under the ADEA.
187
Employee benefit plans are addressed by ADEA section 4(f) (2) (B),
which permits an employer to utilize a bona fide employee benefit
182. SeeSECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 164, at 15.
183. See29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A).
184. See Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (holding that
plaintiffs must demonstrate discriminatory intent under pre-1990 language of section
4(f) (2) (A) making it lawful to observe the terms of an employee benefit plan as long as plan is
not designed to evade the purposes of ADEA), superseded by statute on other grounds, 29 U.S.C. §
623(f) (2) (1994); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing
to apply disparate impact analysis to claim brought under section 4 where employer's seniority
system would have required employer to pay plaintiff more money than amount allocated to
available position); EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unif. Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927, 933 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (citations omitted) ("Even if a seniority system has a disparate effect on a protected class,
the system can be attacked only by showing it was created with a discriminatory intent.").
185. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346 n.28 (1977)
(holding that Titie VII suits may be brought against a bona fide seniority system only if harm
resulted from intentional discrimination); Lorrance v. AT&T. Techs., 490 U.S. 900, 904 (1989)
(same).
186. See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 164, at 6 (criticizing age limits on hiring as an
"obvious kind of discrimination" that involves a failure to consider "a particular applicant's in-
dividual qualifications").
187. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 613 (1993) (noting that an employer
would commit intentional age discrimination if it "suppose [s] a correlation" between two fac-
tors like advanced age and pension eligibility and acts accordingly by discriminating against
pension-eligible employees).
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plan as long as (1) the plan does not "excuse the failure to hire any
individual" or "require or permit involuntary retirement... because
of the age of such individual" and (2) "for each benefit or benefit
package, the actual amount of payment made or cost incurred on
behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or incurred on
behalf of a younger worker. . . "' This provision addresses employ-
ers' legitimate financial concern with the increased pension and in-
surance costs that may be associated with the employment of older
workers. Although employers cannot refuse to employ older workers
on these grounds, they need not incur any greater expense for an
older worker than they would for a younger worker.' Unlike section
4(f)'s seniority exception, the pension plan exception is an objective,
equal cost benefit rule, and therefore does not excuse unintentional
non-compliance with the ADEA.19'
As the above discussion illustrates, the statutory scheme actually
enacted by Congress belies any argument that Congress intended to
remedy the effects of age-neutral "institutional arrangements" only
through "programmatic measures." To varying degrees, all of these
arrangements are regulated by the ADEA's prohibitions.
Additionally, although Secretary Wirtz recommended that Con-
gress merely "adjust" those institutional arrangements generally de-
signed to protect the older worker, he forwarded no such recommen-
dation for those age-neutral employment practices not designed to
protect the older worker. In fact, he suggested at least one example
of an age-neutral employment practice that should be prohibited:
non-job-related educational requirements. 9'
188. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
189. See supra text accompanying note 188 (quoting the ADEA on lawful practices for em-
ployee benefit plans).
190. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (B) (providing the conditions under which the establishment
of an employee pension benefit plan is unlawful because of age discrimination).
191. SeeSECRETARY'SREPORT, supra note 164, at 3 ("Any formal employment standard which
requires, for example, a high school diploma will obviously work against the employment of
many older workers-unfairly if, despite his limited schooling, an older worker's years of expe-
rience have given him the relevant equivalent of a high school education.") (emphasis added).
While the SECRETARY's REPORT does recommend action to increase the educational opportuni-
ties of older workers as a legislative tool distinct from the prohibition on arbitrary age discrimi-
nation, see id., Secretary Wirtz could not have intended Congress to allocate significant funds
and resources to help older workers meet irrelevant and non-job-related educational require-
ments. Obviously, older workers would not require more education if they already qualified
forjobs based on their existing education and experience. See generally Kaminshine, supra note
162, at 294 ("[I] t would be quite extraordinary to propose use of government-sponsored pro-
grams to combat the effect of arbitrary, unnecessary, or illegitimate standards."). Instead, the
report logically focused on promoting older worker education for the jobs that had been grow-
ing most rapidly: medical and dental technicians, nurses, therapists, technical aides in the sci-
ences and engineering, and mechanics and repairmen for complex equipment and machinery.
See SECRETARY's REPORT, supra note 164, at 12.
1103
1104 THE AMERICAN UNIVERS1IYIAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1071
The interpretive regulations that the Department of Labor issued
under Secretary Wirtz's leadership on June 21, 1968, only nine days
after the ADEA became effective, further support the conclusion that
he intended the ADEA to prohibit certain ostensibly age-neutral, but
non-job-related, employment practices. With his first report to Con-
gress pursuant to section 13 of the ADEA,92 Secretary Wirtz submit-
ted a copy of these regulations,""' which provided that age-neutral
physical fitness standards must be "reasonably necessary for the spe-
cific work to be performed," that "a differentiation based on a physi-
cal examination, but not one based on age," is "reasonable" only for
jobs which "necessitate" stringent physical requirements, and that
age-neutral evaluation factors such as quantity or quality of produc-
tion or educational level must have "a valid relationship to job re-
quirements."'14
These 1968 regulations were entirely consistent with Secretary
Wirtz's findings three years earlier that physical requirements (i.e.,
strength, speed, dexterity, quantity of work) were employers' most
frequently mentioned consideration for restrictions on the hiring of
older workers,' but that many of these requirements had "no stud-
ied basis.' ' 96 With regard to pre-employment physical examinations,
the regulations reflected the Secretary's finding that employers'
"[e] stablished health criteria may or may not differentiate among the
varying physical demands of differentjobs.' 9 7
The regulations also echoed the Secretary's prior criticism of un-
fair educational requirements'"8 that "penalize" the older worker,'9
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 624.
193. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OFLABOR SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 13 OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACr, A REPORT
COVERING ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATUTE DURING 1968, app. A (1969).
194. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(1)-(2) (1968).
195. See RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 172, at 4 (noting that one-third of the reasons
given for restrictions on hiring older workers were physical requirements). Demonstrating the
arbitrariness of many of these physical requirements, the RESEARCH MATERIALS note that while
some employers refused to hire older workers because of purported physical requirements of
certain jobs, other employers hired older workers for the same kinds ofjobs without comment-
ing on their physical capabilities. See id. at 11.
196. See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 164, at 8 (noting that in 70% of cases where age
limits in hiring were premised on physical capabilities, no basis was reported). Indeed, the
Secretary's research revealed that "many employers had very different notions concerning the
age at which physical demands should exclude workers for jobs involving similar duties."
RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 172, at 11-12.
197. RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 172, at 11-12.
198. See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 164, at 3.
199. RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 172, at 81 ("[R]esearchers warn that most standard
tests of capacity and characteristics penalize the older worker, whose experience, judgment,
and dependability might, in practice, compensate for the slower reactions and educational de-
ficiencies that at times cause him to do poorly on tests.").
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his finding that written tests with "little direct relationship to the
jobs" tended to preclude the employment of otherwise-qualified
older applicants, 2°° his testimony in hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Labor,0' Senator Yarborough's suggestion during the
ADEA debates that employment tests must measure job requirements
202in order to fall under the RFOA exception, and several state age
discrimination laws cited in the legislative history, which required
that employees be selected on the basis of the "relevant" and/or
"reasonably necessary" educational, experience, and physical re-
quirements for the job.0 3
In addition, in 1968, the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
ment of Labor dispensed advisory opinions stating that facially-
neutral job requirements and employment practices, such as testing,
must be validated and job-related °. Subsequently, on January 9,
200. See id. at 14.
201. During an exchange with Senator Yarborough, the floor manager of the Senate bill
barring age discrimination, Secretary Wirtz concurred with the Senator's statement that the
purpose of the legislation was "to get away from arbitrary age distinctions and go to judgment
of individuals on their merits." See Senate Hearings, supra note 166, at 51. Secretary Wirtz then
added: "I am wondering whether we should strike any reference to age at all in any connection
and look at employment only in terms of whether the individual does have or does not have the
capacity to do whateverjob it is that that individual is seeking." Id. at 51-52.
202. See 113 CONG. REc. 31,253 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough). Senator Yarbor-
ough offered the following example:
[I]f a test shows that a man cannot do certain things, he might fail to pass the test at
35; he might fail to pass the test at 55. Some men slow up sooner than others. If the
job requires a certain speed and the differentiation is based on factors other than age, the
law would not apply.
Id. (emphasis added).
203. See Senate Hearings, supra note 166, at 153, 156, 249 (discussing Oregon's and New
York's age discrimination laws and administrative guidance); 113 CONG. REc. 31,253 (1967)
(statement of Sen. Yarborough) (referring to New York as a leading state in enacting laws
against age discrimination).
The legislative history also contains two studies performed for the California legislature on
age discrimination. See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on H.R. 3651, 3768, &
4221 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong.
161-396 (1967). One study found that rigid physical and educational requirements "in excess
of actual job requirements may be a kind of 'hidden discrimination.'" Id. at 169. The study
recommended that "arbitrary requirements on recency of education ... be eliminated from
the hiring requirements of public agencies, and that instead appropriate examinations or
qualifications appraisals be utilized to determine whether an applicant meets job standards for
currency of professional or occupational preparation." Id. at 170. The study further recom-
mended the establishment of job specifications that measure an individual's capacities and
qualifications against the duties required for a particularjob. See id; see also id. at 192, 287, 295,
352 (discussing further that facially-neutral job requirements that disadvantage older workers
are a form of hidden discrimination.) Senator Yarborough expressed particular interest in
these studies. See Senate Hearings, supra note 166.
204. See Clarence T. Lindquist, Administrator, Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divi-
sions, U.S. Dep't of Labor, ADEA Opinion Letter (Aug. 1968) (rendering opinion on require-
ment that railroad switchmen and car men be in excellent physical condition and have 20/20
vision). This advisory opinion noted that if "uncorrected 20/20 vision is a requirement rea-
sonably necessary to perform such duties or is in the interest of safety the [RFOA] exception
must apply." Id. In a second opinion letter, the Labor Department stated: "the use of a vali-
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1969, the Labor Department supplemented its interpretive regula-
tions that prohibited facially-neutral, non-job-related employment
practices.0 5 Consistent with these regulations, the EEOC's present-
day interpretive regulations of the ADEA preclude such practices.2
It is significant that Congress has not seen fit to interfere with these
interpretations in their thirty-year history. °7 Such early statutory in-
terpretations by the enforcing agency are "entitled to great defer-
ence."28 Indeed, the Supreme Court has relied on the same body of
regulations as persuasive authority in interpreting the ADEA.2" Con-
sidering that the most significant piece of legislative history for sec-
tion 4 appears to be a document generated by Secretary Wirtz,1 ° what
dated employee test is not, of itself, a violation of the act when such a test is (1) specifically re-
lated to the requirements of the job, (2) fair and reasonable, (3) administered in good faith
and without discrimination on the basis of age, and (4) properly evaluated." Ben. P. Robert-
son, Deputy Administrator, Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions, U.S. Dep't of La-
bor, ADEA Opinion Letter (Oct. 9, 1968).
205. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.104(a) (1969) (adding provision stating that an employer with a
policy of hiring only persons receiving old age Social Security insurance benefits might dis-
criminate against younger employees who also fell within the ADEA's protected age group); see
also id. § 860.104(b) ("The use of a validated employee test is not, of itself, a violation of the Act
when such test is specifically related to the requirements of the job [and] is fair and reason-
able .... ").
206. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1997). This Part of the regulations provides that employ-
ment practices that have an adverse impact on individuals 40 and over and that are defended as
being based on reasonable factors other than age "can only be justified as a business necessity."
Id. Moreover, if an employment test has an adverse impact, it must be validated in accordance
with the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1997).
The Uniform Guidelines are an elaborate set of regulations, mandating that selection proce-
dures with an adverse impact on the protected class be validated and designed to ensure that
the purported "reasonable factor" is significantly related tojob performance. Seeid.
207. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592-93 (1983) (White, J.)
(plurality opinion) (noting that early regulations under Title VI precluding disparate impact
discrimination in federally-funded programs were valid, in part because the Title had "been
consistently administered in this manner for almost two decades without interference by Con-
gress").
208. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (discussing and adopting
EEOC's Title VII requirement that tests be job-related); see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (discussing and adopting EEOC's regulations prohibiting sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination); Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 592 (stating that regulations in-
terpreting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to preclude disparate impact discrimination
.were early interpretations of the statute by the agencies charged with its enforcement, and we
should not reject them absent clear inconsistency with the face or structure of the statute, or
with the unmistakable mandate of the legislative history"). The fact that the ADEA regulations
are interpretive rather than legislative rules should not undermine the high degree ofjudicial
deference owed to them. SeeAlessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 517 n.13 (1981)
("Because an agency empowered to enact legislative rules may choose to issue non-legislative
statements, we review this Treasury Regulation under the scrutiny applicable to interpretive
rules, with due deference to consistent agency practice."); see also Interport Inc. v. Magaw, 135
F.3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("We defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of the laws
and regulations it administers none the less because that interpretation appears in an interpre-
tive rather than a legislative rule.") (citation omitted).
209. SeeWestern Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (relying on 33 Fed. Reg.
9172 (1968) and 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1984) to interpret BFOQexception to ADEA).
210. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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could be more telling about the Secretary's understanding of the
ADEA's prohibitions than the interpretive guidelines generated un-
der his purview and submitted by him to Congress in 1968?2" Given
that the Supreme Court did not adopt disparate impact analysis until
1971, Secretary Wirtz proved to be quite prescient.
In sum, there is substantial evidence in the ADEA's legislative his-
tory to support the application of disparate impact analysis to private
employers, perhaps more than exists in the pre-Griggs legislative his-
tory for Title VII. "' 2 Courts like the Tenth Circuit simply have over-
looked or misinterpreted this evidence.
C. The Hazen Paper Decision
As noted above, several courts invoke the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hazen Paper to preclude, or at least seriously question, the
availability of disparate impact analysis in non-federal ADEA cases.2 1 3
In Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that (1) disparate
treatment "captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit
in the ADEA, '21' and (2) Congress enacted the ADEA out of a con-
cern that "older workers were being deprived of employment on the
basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes,21 5 and therefore,
"[w] hen the employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other
than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes dis-
appears. '' 6 Lower courts interpreting this language conclude that
the ADEA is not implicated in a pure disparate impact case because
the employer was not motivated by age stereotypes, but by age-
neutral, though age-correlated, factors.1 7
There are several points to keep in mind about Hazen Paper which
militate against the per se preclusion of disparate impact analysis in
ADEA cases. The most important, and most obvious, is that Hazen
Paper was a disparate treatment case; the Supreme Court explicitly
declined to rule on the viability of disparate impact analysis under
211. See, e.g., Zubar v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969) (stating that a departmental interpre-
tation of a statute carries the most weight when specifically interpreted by administrators who
participated in its drafting).
212. See Kaminshine, supra note 162, at 291 ("[O]ne searches in vain in the legislative his-
tory to Title VII to find any specific attention to, or awareness of, the concept of disparate im-
pact liability.") (footnote omitted).
213. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008-09 (10th Cir.) (precluding availabil-
ity of disparate impact analysis in ADEA cases), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245 (1996); DiBiase v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); EEOC v. Francis W.
Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
214. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
215. See id.
216. Id. at 611.
217. SeeDiBias4 48 F.3d at 733.
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the ADEA.218 Instead, the Court focused on the type of evidence suf-
ficient to prove discriminatory intent in a case under section 4 of the
ADEA; in particular, when an employer is "wholly motivated by fac-
tors other than age.''9 The Court's holding merely reemphasized
the obvious point that a disparate treatment theory, whether ad-
vanced under the ADEA or Title VII, necessarily will fail if the factor
actually motivating the employer is not the protected characteristic.2
It does not follow, however, that when the employer's motivation is
irrelevant, as in a disparate impact challenge, that it automatically es-
capes liability.
Although no longer good substantive law with respect to Title VII,
the Supreme Court's pregnancy discrimination jurisprudence is in-
structive on this point. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,2' the Court
held that General Electric's disability plan, which paid weekly bene-
fits to employees who became totally disabled as a result of a non-
occupational sickness or accident, did not discriminate because of
sex, even though the plan excluded disabilities arising from preg-
222nancy. The Court based its decision primarily on its earlier deci-
sion in Geduldig v. Aiello,223 which held that a very similar disability
program established under California law did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.224
The Geduldig Court acknowledged that only women can become
pregnant, but nevertheless held that the California disability program
did "not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender
but merely remove[d] one physical condition-pregnancy-from the
list of compensable disabilities. ,225 Indeed, it was "clear" to the Court
that the program did not discriminate unlawfully because it merely
divided potential recipients into two groups, "pregnant women and
218. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 (stating that the Court has never decided whether a
disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA and will not do so in this case).
219. See id. at 611.
220. Compare id. at 610 ("In a disparate treatment case, liability depends on whether the
protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer's decision."), with Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[W]hile an employer
may not take gender into account in making an employment decision (except in those very
narrow circumstances in which gender is a BFOQ), it is free to decide against a woman for
other reasons.").
221. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, 42 U.S. § 2000e(k) (1994).
222. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
223. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
224. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 132-140 (discussing relevance of Geduldig).
225. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20; accord Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140(1977) (noting that a policy denying accumulated seniority to employees returning to work
following a disability caused by childbirth "appears to be neutral in its treatment of male and
female employees" under the policy).
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nonpregnant persons.'' 6 The Court explained that "while the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both
sexes."2
27
Based on Geduldig, the Gilbert Court held that the pregnancy exclu-
sion in General Electric's policy was not tantamount to intentional
sex discrimination under Title VII, unless the pregnancy exclusion
was "a mere 'pretex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other."' 2'' The Court further
held that the pregnancy exclusion still could constitute unlawful dis-
parate impact discrimination, but that the plaintiffs had not made
the requisite showing of a gender-based effect.2 9
The reasoning in Gilbert embodies two principles relevant to the in-
stant discussion. First, intentional discrimination does not necessar-
ily lie merely because there is a high (or even perfect) correlation be-
tween membership in the complainant's protected class (i.e., being
female) and the employer's ostensibly class-neutral decision-making
criterion (pregnancy status as a disqualifier for disability benefits),
particularly when the subset of employees who are not adversely af-
fected by that criterion (non-pregnant persons) consists of members
of the complainant's protected class (non-pregnant females). To
prove intentional discrimination in such a case, there must be evi-
dence that the employer relied on the correlation between class
membership and the neutral decision making criterion as a pretext
for discrimination.2 The second Gilbert principle is that, even assum-
226. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
227. Id.
228. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20).
229. See id at 137 ("[O]ur cases recognize that a prima facie violation of Title VII can be
established in some circumstances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral
plan or classification is to discriminate against members of one class or another."). Cf Satty,
434 U.S. at 150-53 (holding that a policy that denied accumulated seniority to employees re-
turning to work following a disability caused by childbirth was not unlawful intentional dis-
crimination, but might be unlawful under disparate impact analysis).
230 Congress invalidated this principle as applied to the correlation between pregnancy and
gender in 1978 when it amended Title VII to provide that the "terms 'because of sex, and 'on
the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions." Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
555, 92 Star. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)). Despite this
statutory reversal of the result in Gilbert and its progeny (but not the result in Geduldig, which
was brought under the Fourteenth Amendment), the analytical approach Gilbert utilized ar-
guably is still instructive for other types of discrimination claims.
For example, blacks are far more likely to be afflicted with sickle-cell anemia than non-
blacks. If an employer has a policy of rejecting all applicants with sickle-cell anemia such a pol-
icy would not necessarily evidence intentional race discrimination, but it could support a claim
of discrimination based on disparate impact. See EEOC Decision No. 81-8, 27 F.E.P. Cases.
(BNA) 1781 (Nov. 18, 1980) (finding reasonable cause to believe that the employer had en-
gaged in disparate impact race discrimination where employer failed to hire a black applicant
because she suffered from sickle-cell anemia, even though non-blacks with sickle-cell anemia
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ing the absence of pretext evidence, the correlation nevertheless may
evidence disparate impact discrimination.
The Court's Hazen Paper decision is entirely consistent with these
two principles. There, the Court acknowledged the "typical[]" corre-
lation between advanced age and pension-vesting status based on
years of service.23' Yet, the Court held that it is not per se age dis-
crimination to fire an employee solely because his pension is close to
252
vesting. An employee under age forty may have worked for the
company his entire career and be close to a vested pension, while an
older worker may have been newly hired and be a long way from vest-
ing.33 Therefore, under Hazen Paper's pension plan, which required
only ten years of service for pension-vesting, age and years of service
were "analytically distinct."234
This reasoning reflects the first Gilbert principle. Recall that in Gil-
bert, the Court found the denial of pregnancy-related disability bene-
fits not to be intentionally discriminatory because the denial of bene-
fits was independent of gender; that is, despite the obvious
correlation between femaleness and pregnancy-capability (and
hence, the greater potential need of female employees for preg-
nancy-related disability benefits), the Court reasoned that the em-
ployer had differentiated only between pregnant women and non-
235pregnant persons, not between men and women.
also would have been rejected; whereas I in 500 Blacks are afflicted with sickle-cell anemia,
only 1 in 6,250,000 Caucasians are so afflicted). Likewise, an employer does not necessarily
commit intentional disability discrimination by failing to hire a disabled applicant just because
the reason is highly correlated with the person's disability. See Matthews v. Commonwealth Edi-
son Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1195-96 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing case law holding that a disabled
individual cannot claim intentional discrimination simply because his disability makes him un-
qualified for the job). For example, if a security guard position requires constant examination
of picture identification, then a person with profound visual impairment probably cannot
complain of intentional discrimination when he is not hired, even though there is a high corre-
lation between the disability (visual impairment) and the employer's disability-neutral selection
criterion (being able to read picture i.d.). Cf id. at 1195 (noting that a blind person cannot
complain of intentional discrimination because a prison refuses to hire him as a guard) (citing
Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1997)). Such a person, how-
ever, still may be able to prove disparate impact discrimination. See id. at 1195-96 (citing Hazen
Paper for the proposition that the individual's only recourse is through disparate impact analy-
sis).
231. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) ("On average, an older em-
ployee has had more years in the work force than a younger employee, and thus may well have
accumulated more years of service with a particular employer.").
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id; see also RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 172, at 56 ("Since one grows older in
the process of attaining years of service, the correlation between age and length of service is
obviously high.... [But] [l]ength of service (seniority status) and age are synonymous only on
the average .... ").
235. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136-38 (stating that the "package" of benefits for male and fe-
male employees "covers exactly the same categories of risk").
1998] FEDERAL-SECTOR AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Similarly, in Hazen Paper, the Court found the denial of pension
benefits not to be intentionally discriminatory because the alleged
denial of benefits was independent of age.3 Despite the high corre-
lation between advanced age and pension-vesting based on years of
service, the evidence of pension discrimination at most showed that
the employer had differentiated between those employees who had
the requisite number of service years to be considered close to vest-
ing and those who did notY7 While the former group may have con-
sisted primarily of older workers, the second (according to the
Court's speculation) consisted of both younger and older workers.2 8
Accordingly, the Court held that to sustain a claim of intentional age
discrimination premised on alleged pension discrimination there
must be evidence that the pension discrimination, was in fact, a pre-
text for age discrimination. " 9 This is precisely the type of evidence
that the first Gilbert principle would require.
If the parallel between Gilbert and Hazen Paper is to be complete,
then application of the second Gilbert principle would permit an
ADEA plaintiff to rely on the correlation between advanced age and
pension status as evidence of disparate impact discrimination. Thus,
just because an age-based correlation does not necessarily prove in-
tentional age discrimination (per Hazen Paper), the Gilbert decision
suggests that such evidence still could form the foundation of a dis-
parate impact claim.
The Hazen Paper Court's observation that disparate treatment
"captures the essence" of the ADEA prohibitions240 does not necessar-
ily undermine this argument. Until 1967, facially age-discriminatory
employment policies were legal (except in twenty states) and repre-
sented the "most obvious kind of age discrimination., 24' Three out of
every five employers covered by Labor Secretary Wirtz's study had "in
effect age limitations on new hires which they appl[ied] without con-
sideration of an applicant's other qualifications. 2 42 But just as such
policies were the primary impetus of the ADEA, so too were facially-
race-discriminatory employment practices the primary impetus be-
236. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611-12.
237. See id. at 612.
238. See id at 611.
239. See id. at 612-13 (holding that intentional age discrimination still may be proved
through evidence that the employer "suppos[ed] a correlation" between age and pension
status and acted accordingly).
240. See id. at 610 (explaining that the protected trait must influence the employer's deci-
sion for liability to exist).
241. SeeSEcRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 164, at 6.
242. Id.
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hind the passage of Title VII in 1964.243 Obviously, disparate treat-
ment does not define the limit of Title VII's reach, even though it
may "capture the essence" of Title VII's prohibitions. Arguably, the
same is true for the ADEA.
Additionally, it may be unwise to draw an inference against ADEA
disparate impact liability from the "captures the essence" statement,
given the Court's minimal, almost "off-the-cuff' characterization of
the ADEA's legislative history. As the Court admonished in another
employment discrimination case, "it [is] generally undesirable, where
holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the
United States Reports as though they were the United States Code.
44
Equally important for purposes of this Article is the fact that the
Court did not interpret section 15 of the ADEA, nor did it examine
its legislative history. Although disparate treatment may capture the
essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in section 4 of the
ADEA,245 it does not appear to capture the essence of the unique
concerns that motivated Congress' addition of section 15 in 1974.246
Even assuming that the Court's characterization of the congres-
sional intent behind the ADEA is unassailable, the Court has empha-
sized that congressional intent does not necessarily limit the use of
remedial theories that are otherwise consistent with the statutory
scheme. For example, Justice Scalia recently noted in a Title VII case
that "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed., 247 Because the Court has previously held
that disparate treatment and disparate impact are "functionally
equivalent '248 (i.e. "reasonably comparable evils"), there is not neces-
sarily a statutory impediment to extending disparate impact liability
to ADEA cases, notwithstanding what Congress purportedly had in
mind in 1967, four years before the Supreme Court first endorsed
disparate impact analysis.
Nor is disparate impact analysis necessarily precluded by the Hazen
Paper Court's observation that the problem of inaccurate and stigma-
tizing stereotypes disappears when the employer's decision is wholly
243. Kaminshine, supra note 162, at 291 & n.303.
244. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,515 (1993).
245. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610.
246. See supra Part II.D.
247. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998) (holding that same-
sex sexual harassment is prohibited by Title VII, even though "male-on-male sexual harassment
in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it en-
acted Tide VII").
248. SeeWatson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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motivated by factors other than age.21' The Court previously has con-
cluded under Title VII that disparate impact analysis helps police
"the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices." Thus,
even assuming that age discrimination does not exist when the em-
ployer is "wholly motivated by factors other than age,'' 5 ' proving the
elements of disparate impact arguably is equivalent to proving that
the employer was, at least in part, subconsciously motivated by age. It
is unclear, however, whether the logic of this argument would permit
a disparate impact challenge against any age-neutral decision-making
factor that tends to have an adverse impact on older workers (i.e., an
entirely subjective promotion system).
It may be empirically unfounded, however, to assume that age bias
necessarily lies at the heart of every disparate impact case, no matter
what the challenged decision-making factor may be. It is conceivable
that at least sometimes an age-based disparate impact claim can stem
from the coincidental interplay of circumstances, not conscious or
subconscious bias. In such cases, the use of disparate impact analysis
must be justified solely by the age-exclusionary effect of the unjustifi-
able employment criteria, not the motivation behind them.2
The remaining question is whether there is a statutory justification
for disparate impact analysis (or something akin to disparate impact)
that is not premised on an intent-based model. This question is ad-
dressed in the following section of this Article.
D. The RFOA Exception
Section 4(f) (1) of the ADEA provides that it is not age discrimina-
tion for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization "to
take any action otherwise prohibited.., where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age"-the "RFOA" excep-
tion.2*  As discussed below, several courtse 4 have pointed to the
249. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611 (1993) (stating that even if the motivating factor is corre-
lated with age, the problem of stigmatizing stereotypes disappears).
250. Watson, 487 U.S. 977 at 990 (holding that disparate impact analysis can be applied to
subjective or discretionary employment practices); see also EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41
F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy,J., dissenting) (noting that disparate impact analysis
targets discrimination that is "at times hidden even from the decision maker herself, reflecting
perhaps subconscious predilections and stereotypes").
251. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611.
252. See Kaminshine, supra note 162, at 314-15 (criticizing the "intent model" of disparate
impact that views this theory of proof as an alternative means of proving discriminatory intent;
arguing that Griggs requires a focus on the "consequences of employment practices, not the moti-
vation").
253. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1) (1994). Other exceptions to age discrimination include sec-
tion 4(f) (1)'s BFOQ and foreign workplace exceptions, section 4(f) (2)'s bona fide seniority
system and employee benefit plan exceptions, and section 4(f) (3)'s good cause exception. See
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RFOA exception as additional evidence that disparate impact claims
are not cognizable under section 4 of the ADEA by drawing a parallel
between the ADEA's RFOA exception and the Equal Pay Act, which
permits employers to pay unequal wages to men and women if the
pay differential is "based on any factor other than sex."
25
In County of Washington v. Gunther,26 the Supreme Court indicated
that the EPA's "any factor other than sex" exception immunizes em-
ployers from sex-based wage discrimination claims that are not moti-
vated by discriminatory animus. 7 The Court remarked that this ex-
ception "was designed differently" than Title VII's prohibitions,
which, by virtue of Griggs, encompass disparate impact liability.2
The Gunther court noted that (in contrast to Title VII) "Equal Pay Act
litigation... has been structured to permit employers to defend
against charges of discrimination where their pay differentials are
based on a bona fide use of 'other factors other than sex,"'2 -9 and that
courts may not substitute their judgment for that of employer.25 Ac-
cordingly, under the EPA's "other factors other than sex" defense,
the employer will prevail as long as its motivation, even if misguided
or mistaken, was not subjectively motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose.26' The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have extended this logic to
the RFOA exception, reasoning that disparate treatment is the sole
avenue of relief under the ADEA.62
There are several problems with analogizing the Equal Pay Act to
the ADEA. First, there is a significant linguistic difference between
the RFOA exception and the "other factors other than sex" excep-
tion. Whereas the Equal Pay Act condones unequal wages based on
any factors other than sex,263 the ADEA condones employer reliance
only on reasonable factors other than age. 26' The word "reasonable"
implies that the fact finder is required to analyze the objective validity
supra Part 11A (discussing several exceptions to age discrimination that appear in section 4 but
not in section 15).
254. See infra note 256-62 and accompanying text.
255. See29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994);see also Hyman v. First Union Corp., 980 F. Supp. 38,
43-44 (D.D.C. 1997); Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 959 F. Supp. 742, 747 (E.D. Va. 1997).
256. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
257. See id. at 170.
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 171 (quoting 109 CONG. REc. 9209 (1963) (statement of Rep. Goodell)).
261. See id. at 170 (finding employers may defend discrimination action if pay differentials
are rationalized on a good faith use of "other factors other than sex).
262. SeeEllis v. United Airlines, Inc,. 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245
(1996); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077.(7th Cir. 1994).
263. See29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
264. See29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994).
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of the employer's decision-making, an analysis that the Supreme
Court in Gunther said is improper under the Equal Pay Act wherein
the analysis focuses solely on whether the employer acted out of dis-
criminatory animus.""
Second, the Equal Pay Act's "other factors other than sex" excep-
tion is fairly well established as an affirmative defense. 67 This af-
firmative defense places the burden of proof, not just production, on
the employer. The Tenth Circuit, however, has held that the RFOA
exception is not an affirmative defense."' Thus, the Tenth Circuit's
attempt to draw a parallel between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act
would create an inconsistency with its prior holding.
If the Equal Pay Act analogy is to have any force, then the RFOA
exception would have to be construed as an affirmative defense to in-
tentional age discrimination. This application of the RFOA excep-
tion, however, would present a new problem. Suppose a fifty year-old
brought suit against his employer under a disparate treatment theory
claiming age as the reason for his termination. The employer might
respond that the employee had been terminated for failing to meet
his production quota. As production quota would constitute a
"reasonable factor other than age" for the termination and the em-
ployer would bear the burden of proving deficient performance. But
substitute the ADEA plaintiff with a woman claiming sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII, and the burden of proof remains on her at all
265. See Kaminshine, supra note 162, at 302-04 (discussing this linguistic distinction); see also
supra notes 191-210 and accompanying text (discussing early agency regulations interpreting
the RFOA exception to require objective validation of certain job requirements). In its em-
ployment discrimination jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the word
"reasonable" entails an objective analysis into the alleged discriminatory conduct. For exam-
ple, in Griggs, the Court stated that, to make an objective determination of business necessity
under the disparate impact analysis, the question is whether the employer's selection mecha-
nisms are "demonstrably a reasonable measure ofjob performance." Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (emphasis added). Also, to prove hostile work environment sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, conduct that is "severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
(emphasis added).
266. SeeCounty of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981);supra notes 256-61 and
accompanying text (discussing the Guntherdecision).
267. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974) (noting with approval
uniform holdings by lower courts that the Equal Pay Act's "other factors other than sex" excep-
tion is an affirmative defense); see also Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168-70, 175 (referring to Equal Pay
Act's "other factors other than sex" exception as an affirmative defense).
268 See Coming Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 191 & n.ll (finding that the majority of federal
courts place the burden of proof for an affirmative defense under the Equal Pay Act on the
employer).
269. SeeSchwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that after a plain-
tiff makes a prima facie case, only burden of producing evidence shifts to the employer).
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times, because Title VII contains no RFOA exception"
Could Congress have intended to provide age discrimination
plaintiffs more procedural protection than Title VII plaintiffs? There
is some evidence to support that inference. Prior to the CRA, ADEA
plaintiffs suing under section 4 had the right to a jury trial 7' and liq-
uidated damages,2 7 whereas Title VII plaintiffs did not.2 3  In addi-
tion, ADEA plaintiffs could bring lawsuits sixty days after filing a
charge with the EEOC,274 whereas Title VII plaintiffs might have to
wait as long as 180 days before they could bring suit.2 7 5 Furthermore,
under Title VII, back pay was a matter of equitable discretion,
whereas liability for back pay was mandatory under the ADEA .2 76 Fi-
nally, in 1990, Congress enacted the Older Workers Benefit Protec-
tion Act ("OWBPA"),277 which strictly defined the circumstances un-
der which an individual's waiver of his age discrimination claim is
considered "knowing and voluntary" and put the burden of proving
voluntariness on the party asserting the validity of the waiver, usually
the employer.278  Title VII contains no comparable protection for
employees covered under that statute. Significantly, in the course of
enacting the OWBPA, Congress noted that it had "decided in 1967
that where procedural protections are involved, the ADEA should
treat older workers differently from workers protected under Title
VII.,,279
Still, putting age-discrimination plaintiffs in such a favorable posi-
tion "would create an odd jurisprudence., 280 As previously discussed,
courts have uniformly applied the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine three-
step analysis for proving intentional discrimination in ADEA cases
(with the Supreme Court's implicit approval),281 and there is no indi-
270. SeeTexas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981) (noting that
in a Title VII case "the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff').
271. See29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (2) (1994).
272. See id. § 626(b).
273. As a result of the CRA, Title VII plaintiffs suing under a disparate treatment theory
now have the right to compensatory and punitive damages and a jury trial. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)-(c) (1994).
274. See29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
275. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).
276. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (contrasting remedial provisions of
ADEA and Title VII).
277. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 101 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
278. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (f) (delineating what constitutes waiver and what party bears burden
of proving validity of such waiver).
279. SeeH.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 24 (1990).
280. SeeKaminshine, supra note 162, at 305 (emphasis added).
281. See supra note 23 (discussing Supreme Court's approval in Hazen Paper of the three-
step analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas to prove intentional discrimination in ADEA
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cation that the Seventh and Tenth Circuits are prepared to abandon
this analysis in favor of a burden-shifting, affirmative defense analy-
sis.282 Thus, to avoid the upheaval of well-established disparate treat-
ment jurisprudence, the RFOA exception probably cannot be con-
strued as an affirmative defense to intentional discrimination, 2,3 and
the Equal Pay Act analogy must therefore fail.
A procedural problem still persists, however, if the RFOA excep-
tion is construed to be any kind of defense to disparate treatment. A
well-established principle of disparate treatment law, under both Ti-
tle VII and the ADEA, is that liability for intentional discrimination
cannot rest on the fact that the employer acted unreasonably.
28 4
Rather, even if the employer is misguided or mistaken in his or her
reasoning, the employer has not intentionally discriminated if he or
she honestly believed the reason was legitimate at the time he or she
subjected the plaintiff to an adverse employment action.8 5 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has held that an employer can act for any reason
under the ADEA (unreasonable or even illegal), as long as its
"decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age.
'2' 6
cases).
282. See supra note 24 (citing recent decisions of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits applying
the three-step analysis to ADEA cases).
283. But see 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e) (1997) (stating that the RFOA exception could be raised
as an affirmative defense to disparate treatment). Arguably, the RFOA exception could apply
to mixed-motives cases. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. Where the plaintiff prof-
fers either direct evidence, or at least high quality circumstantial evidence, that age-based ani-
mus played a substantial role in the employment decision, the employer still could prevail by
proving that it would have made the same decision regardless of the age-based animus due to
its concurrent reliance on a "reasonable factor other than age." In this way, the RFOA excep-
tion would be an affirmative defense for the employer, akin to the BFOQ affirmative defense
used in cases where an employment policy discriminates on its face against older workers. The
Hazen Paper decision, however, appears to preclude this use of the RFOA exception, because
when intentional discrimination is alleged (as in a mixed-motives case) the subjective motiva-
tion, not the objective reasonableness of the employer's actions, is the relevant issue. See Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993).
284. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
285. SeeKeller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The plain-
tiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual
dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent." (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,
765 (3d Cir. 1994))); see also Wolf v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919-20 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that test of pretext in ADEA case is whether employer honestly believes reasons it
gives, not whether it made mistakes or bad business judgments).
286. See Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611. The Court further remarked:
Although some language in our prior decisions might be read to mean that an em-
ployer violates the ADEA whenever its reason for firing an employee is improper in
any respect .... this reading is obviously incorrect. For example, it cannot be true that
an employer who fires an older black worker because the worker is black thereby vio-
lates the ADEA. The employee's race is an improper reason, but it is improper under
Title VII, not the ADEA.
Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
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Application of the RFOA exception to ADEA disparate treatment
cases would fly in the face of this well-settled rule. An employer fac-
ing a claim of intentional discrimination would not be able to defend
its business decision solely on the ground that it had been subjec-
tively motivated by the non-age factor. Instead, it would have to prof-
fer evidence showing that its decision was objectively "reasonable,"
something that the Supreme Court has held it is not required to
do.
287
Thus, unless the word "reasonable" is to be read out of the RFOA
exception," the exception must be applied in cases where subjective
motivation is irrelevant. This application of the RFOA exception
would be consistent with the fact that the use of the word
"reasonable" imposes an objective standard, similar to 'Job-
relatedness" and "business necessity" in Title VII disparate impact
cases.
The question then becomes: What is the employer's burden when
an age-neutral factor is challenged as objectively unreasonable under
the ADEA? On the one hand, the RFOA exception could be read
consistently with the Griggs "business necessity" standard, which re-
quires the employer to prove that the challenged practices are
"demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance."' Treating
the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense to charges of disparate
impact would be consistent with the ADEA's legislative history and
the EEOC's interpretive regulations, as well as with the RFOA excep-
tion's placement between the BFOQ exception and the foreign
workplace exception in section 4(f) (1).2
287. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
288. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (noting the "settled
rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some op-
erative effect") (citations omitted).
289. SeeGriggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 436 (1971) (emphasis added) (noting
that various testing procedures are useful but they must bear a reasonable relationship to job's
qualifications).
290. Professor Eglit offers several arguments in support of treating the RFOA exception as
an affirmative defense. First, he posits that the Equal Pay Act's ("EPA") "other factors other
than sex" affirmative defense is analogous to the ADEA's RFOA exception, because the EPA is
part of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Supreme Court has held that Congress
intended to fully incorporate into the ADEA the remedies and procedures of the FLSA. See 1
HOWARD C. EGLIT, AGEDIScRIMINATION § 5.17, at 5-68 to 5-69 (2d ed. 1994) (citing Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-82 (1978)). Although this argument has superficial appeal, as dis-
cussed above, a true analogy would require excising the word "reasonable" from the RFOA ex-
ception.
Second, Professor Eglit relies on interpretations of the RFOA exception by the Department
of Labor and the EEOC, which treat the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense. See id. §
5.18, at 5-70; see, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1997)
(requiring an employer to bear burden of proving that RFOA exists factually). See also supra
notes 192-212 and accompanying text (outlining legislative history of the ADEA).
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Alternatively, Wards Cove may provide the appropriate analytical
standards. As discussed in Part I, Congress statutorily overturned
Wards Cove through the CRA, but did not do so explicitly with respect
to the ADEA. Therefore, Wards Cove may still play a persuasive role
in ADEA cases.
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court held that the employer bears the
burden of producing evidence, not proving, that its challenged prac-
tice serves its "legitimate employment goals.., in a significant way,,
292
and that the touchstone of this inquiry is a "reasoned view of the em-
ployer's justification for his use of the challenged practice. 293  If
Wards Cove applies, the employer would only have to produce evi-
dence that reliance on its non-age factor is reasonable.294
Then again, Wards Cove may have little persuasive value to the ex-
tent that the CRA is viewed more generally as a congressional state-
ment that the Supreme Court simply "got it wrong" when it revised
long-standing disparate impact doctrine in Wards Cove.2 5 Even
though the CRA's disparate impact amendments technically apply
only to non-federal Title VII claims, the persuasive reach of these
amendments arguably extends beyond Title VII, to other statutory
schemes.2 For example, even though the disparate impact amend-
ments of the CRA, on their face, apply only to claims under section
Third, Professor Eglit argues that the ADEA's legislative history demonstrates that "the
RFOA provision was not deemed to be distinctive from, or different than, the BFOQ exception
with which it shares placement in section 4(f) (1)" and "which has consistently and without ar-
gument been recognized as an affirmative defense." See 1 EGLIT, supra § 5.16, at 5-66 to 5-67
(noting how ADEA hearings ignored the RFOA exception, the committee reports failed to ex-
plain the exception, the Senate floor manager of the ADEA legislation failed to differentiate
between the RFOA & BROQ exceptions, and how the ADEA was not hastily drafted); see also
Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416 n.24 (1985) (endorsing BFOQanalysis used
by Fifth Circuit and EEOC that places burden of proving exception on the employer).
As further support of Professor Eglit's argument, one district court has noted that the other
exception contained in section 4(f) (1), the foreign workplace exception, is also an affirmative
defense. See Mahoney v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.
1992), ("[I]n order to make out a defense under § 623(f) (1), defendant must show that com-
pliance would cause defendant to violate German law."), reu'd on other grounds, 47 F.3d 447
(D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Clarence Thomas, Chairman, EEOC, Policy Guidance: Analysis of
'Foreign Laws'Defense of ADEA (Dec. 5, 1989) (noting that the employer has the burden of prov-
ing the elements of the foreign workplace exception).
291. See 1 EGLIT, supra note 290, § 5.19, at 5-78 (noting courts' apparent continued use of
Wards Covedecision in a "persuasive analogical role" in ADEA cases).
292. SeeWards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) rev'd in part by statute,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
293. See id. (emphasis added).
294. See id. (noting that challenged practice need not be "essential" or "indispensable").
295. See infra Part III.G.
296. See, e.g., Matthews v. Runyon, 860 F. Supp. 1347, 1354-55 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (applying
section 703 of Title VII to a discrimination action brought under section 717 against U.S. Postal
Service). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has looked to the CRA's disparate impact amendments in
a Fair Housing Act case. SeePfaffv. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 745 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging
applicability of Title VII case jurisprudence).
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703 of Title VII, at least one court has assumed that the amendments
govern employment discrimination cases brought by federal employ-
ees under section 717. 7 More importantly, several district court de-
cisions have looked to the disparate impact amendments to Title VII
when addressing ADEA disparate impact claimss2
Perhaps a compromise is in order. One district court has placed
the burden of proving the RFOA exception on the employer
(consistent with Griggs), but required a lesser showing than business
necessity (consistent with Wards Cove) .2 Regardless of whether Wards
Cove, Griggs, a combination of the two, or some other analytical para-
digm300 applies to cases defended under the RFOA exception, the fact
remains that in order to avoid reading the RFOA exception out of
the ADEA, some form of objective analysis distinct from disparate
treatment must be recognized.
E. The Language of Section 4 of the ADEA
Section 4 of the ADEA makes it unlawful to discriminate against an
individual "because of such individual's age.""'1 As further support
for its refusal to recognize disparate impact analysis, the Tenth Cir-
cuit asserts that "[t]he most obvious reading of the clause, 'because
of such individual's age,' is that it prohibits an employer from inten-
297. See Mathews, 860 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
298. See Bramble v. American Postal Workers Union, 963 F. Supp. 90, 100-01 (D.R.I. 1997)
(noting different burden standards imposed on employers by disparate impact amendments to
Title VII), aff'd, 135 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59
(8th Cir. 1994) (implying that the CRA amendments to disparate impact doctrine would apply
to ADEA claims filed after the effective date of the CRA); Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place,
Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D.N.J. 1994) (analyzing ADEA disparate impact claims in light of
CRA amendments), afjfd, 67 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995); Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F. Supp.
389, 394 (D. Me. 1994) (noting applicability of CRA amendments to disparate impact cases
filed after the CRA effective date), afj'd, 60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 1995).
299. See EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unif. Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927, 932 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(observing that "Congress intended employers to have more leeway in considering factors that
disparately affect older workers under the ADEA than factors that disparately affect classes pro-
tected under Title VII").
300. Professor Eglit draws a distinction between RFOA cases and disparate impact cases un-
der the ADEA. He argues that Wards Cove, placing only a burden of production on the em-
ployer, applies to ADEA cases brought under a disparate impact theory. See 1 EGLIT, supra note
290, § 5.19, at 5-78 to 5-79. He argues further that when an employment policy affects older
workers, but does not rise to the level of statistical disparity required by disparate impact law,
the RFOA exception could still play a role as an affirmative defense. See id. at 5-79. In this lat-
ter type of case, Professor Eglit suggests that, due to the inferior statistical showing of adverse
impact, the employer should bear the burden of proving that its decision was "substantially rea-
sonable," and not bear the burden of proving business necessity. See id. at 5-80. This analytical
scheme seems counter-intuitive, however, because it increases the burden on the employer
from merely producing evidence to proving, as the plaintiffs statistical evidence becomes
weaker.
301. See29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1)-(2) (1994).
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tionally treating someone differently based on his or her age."'0 2
The Tenth Circuit's "obvious reading," however, is both unsup-
ported and in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's construction
of the identical operative words contained in Title VII, which likewise
prohibits discrimination "because of' a protected characteristic. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly found the phrase "because of' to
permit disparate impact analysis, reasoning that the phrase codifies
the requirement of a causal connection between the protected trait
and the challenged employment practice. °3 This causal connection
is required in every discrimination case, no matter what the method
of proof."4
F. Purported "Practical Problems" With Disparate Impact Analysis Under
the ADEA
The Tenth Circuit has also speculated that permitting disparate
impact age discrimination claims would create several practical prob-
lems.""5 Specifically, the court has expressed concern that "the line
defining the class that is disparately impacted by a challenged policy
is an imprecise one, which could be manipulated to either
strengthen or weaken the impact of a policy on some age group.30 6
302. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir.) (asserting that interpreta-
tion of the clause "because of such individual's age" as covering incidental and unintentional
discrimination is far fetched), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245 (1996). This semantic argument would
have little persuasive value as far as federal-sector ADEA claims are concerned because section
15 does not prohibit discrimination "because of such individual's age," but rather "all
[discriminatory] personnel action... based on age," 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)
(emphasis added).
303. SeeWards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) ("The persuasion bur-
den [under disparate impact analysis] must remain with the plaintiff, for it is he who must
prove that it was 'because of such individual's race, color, [etc.],' that he was denied a desired
employment opportunity.") (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)),rev'd in part by
statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 241-42 (1989) (plurality opinion) (interpreting words"because of" contained in Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination to encompass "indirect stumbling block(s] to employ-
ment opportunities,' such as in disparate impact cases challenging facially-neutral tests or
qualifications); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-92 (1988) (plurality opin-
ion) (holding that "an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decision making has pre-
cisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination," be-
cause "[iln both circumstances, the employer's practices may be said to adversely affect [an
individual's] status as an employee, because of such individual's [protected class]" (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2)) (emphasis added).
304. For example, the Watson Court noted that under disparate impact analysis that
once the employment practice at issue has been identified, causation must be proved;
that is, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to
show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or
promotions because of their membership in a protected group.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (emphasis added).
305. SeeEllis, 73 F.3d at 1009.
306. Id.
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Imprecision, however, should not be a reason to utterly preclude a
remedy for age discrimination.
For example, in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, Corp.,"7 a
unanimous Supreme Court held that an ADEA plaintiff suing for
wrongful termination under a disparate treatment theory need not
submit evidence of replacement by someone outside of the protected
class to establish his prima facie case.08 Instead, the Court held that
it was sufficient to show that one's replacement was "substantially
younger."309 Thus, rather than permitting use of a precise, bright-line
test, the Supreme Court requires a court to make the far more im-
precise determination of whether the replacement is "substantially
younger.0
1 0
Still, the Tenth Circuit's point has some force. Unlike race or sex
discrimination cases, where it is typically clear who the appropriate
comparison groups are (i.e., blacks versus non-blacks, or women ver-
sus men), the continuous nature of age makes the definition of the
comparison groups more difficult.3 ' Thus, it is possible, for age
groupings to be manipulated to produce a desired statistical result.12
Courts, however, are not powerless to deter such manipulation.
They can either establish bright-line rules for defining appropriate
subgroups or assess the reasonableness of any particular subgrouping
on a case-by-case basis.1 3 The latter approach would be consistent
with the Supreme Court's belief that statistical disparities need not be
307. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
308. See id. at 312-13.
309. See id. (noting that whether the individual who replaces the plaintiff is "outside the
protected class" is not a reliable criterion).
310. Seeid.
311. As two commentators have queried,
Can an individual establish disparate impact by showing that a selection mechanism
caused an adverse impact on those of his or her age or older? On those of his or her
age and some fixed number of years (say, 5 or 10 years) older? On those of his and
her age alone?
RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION § 7.11, at 7-24
(1996).
312. See id. (noting that "[i]n the absence of constraints on the types of groupings avail-
able," manipulation of such age groupings in order to obtain certain statistical results is possi-
ble).
313. Paetzold and Willbom set forth one way of assessing the reasonableness of a subgroup-
ing:
An estimated probability of termination (corresponding to a specific selection
mechanism or decision-making procedure) could be obtained for any age in the pro-
tected class.... [T]he [termination] rate for the group at issue could be compared
with the [termination] rate for the unprotected group to determine if there was a sta-
tistically significant difference in the two rates. The continuous nature of the age vari-
able need not be a statistical problem under disparate impact analysis.
Id. at 7-24 to 7-25.
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"framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula 314 and that a
case-by-case approach accurately reflects the Court's recognition that
there are an infinite variety of statistics and their usefulness depends
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances."
One bright-line solution would be to hold that the disparate im-
pact theory is not available to subgroups of persons age forty and
over. In other words, to make out a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact, the plaintiffs must show a statistically significant disparity be-
tween the impact of an employment policy on employees age forty
and over versus the impact on those under age forty. The Second
316Circuit has employed just such a rule.
Although this approach is elegant in its simplicity, it appears to
314. SeeWatson v. Fort Worth Bank &Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988) (plurality opinion).
315. See id. at 996 n.3 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977), and dis-
cussing evidentiary standards in discriminatory treatment cases). Two commentators point out
that Congress explicitly recognized the disparate impact doctrine when it enacted the CRA, but
took care to ensure that no jury trials would be available in Title VII and ADA cases based on
allegations of disparate impact. See Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic
Argument Against Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L.
REV. 625, 651 (1996). The authors assert that the CRA's legislative history"does not reveal the
reasons why Congress chose not to grant jury trials in Title VII disparate impact cases, but it
seems likely that it was because of the bewildering complexity of the statistical proof and expert
testimony in Title VII disparate impact cases." Id. at 652 & n.147 (noting that there "were no
committee hearings or reports" on the CRA). They conclude that the judiciary should be re-
luctant to create a disparate impact cause of action under the ADEA, because through the
CRA, Congress "specifically chose not to entrust such complex disparate impact issues to lay
juries." Id. at 660.
This conclusion is unfounded, because the House Judiciary Committee Report (which the
commentators imply does not even exist) unambiguously explains that Congress added a jury
trial right only to Title VII and ADA intentional discrimination claims for damages, 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(a) (1), (c), in order to"protect the rights of all persons under the Seventh Amendment."
H.R. REP. No. 10240(II), at 29 (1991). Because damages are not available for a Title VII dispa-
rate impact claim, Congress decided that a "jury trial would not be available in such cases." Id.
Thus, there appears to be little, if any, basis for the commentators' speculation that Congress
acted out of concern for jury confusion in disparate impact cases. Rather, Congress was con-
cerned about protecting litigants' constitutional right to trial by jury when legal damages are
sought.
In any event, the commentators fail to explain adequately why a bench trial necessarily rep-
resents a better solution for coping with the potential complexities of statistical evidence, as
opposed to ajury trial under the guidance of ajudge (who may or may not have a better un-
derstanding of statistics than thejurors). If the statistical issues in a particular disparate impact
case truly appear too complex for a jury such that instructions alone would not suffice, the
judge always could refer these issues to a competent special master for resolution. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 53(b) (providing that reference to a special master is appropriate injury cases "when
the issues are complicated"); FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e) (3) (providing that the master's finding are
admissible into evidence and may be read to thejury). Moreover, if it appears to the judge that
the jury unreasonably has found (or failed to find) a statistically significant adverse impact, the
judge has the option of setting aside the jury verdict and either entering judgment as a matter
of law or granting a new trial. See FED. R. Ci,'. P. 50(a), (b). In no event, however, should the
potential complexity of statistical proof utterly deny a remedy for employment practices that
violate the ADEA.
316. See Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1373 (2d Cir. 1989)
(refusing to recognize subgroups of older members in the over-39 protected group for pur-
poses of disparate impact claims).
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contradict the language and history of the ADEA. Sections 4 and 15
of the ADEA both protect "individuals," not groups, against age dis-
crimination.1 7 As the Supreme Court explained in O'Connor "This
language does not ban discrimination against employees because
they are aged [forty] or older; it bans discrimination against employ-
ees because of their age, but limits the protected class to those who
are [forty] or older." ' 8 In other words, the ADEA does not prohibit
discrimination only against those "40 or over. 3 9 The critical issue is
whether individuals who are at least age forty suffered age discrimina-
tion vis-a-vis any other person or persons in any other age group."'
One district court has rejected the preceding argument solely on
the ground that O'Connor was a disparate treatment case.32' It is un-
317. See Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 848 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Me. 1994) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
623(a), which outlaws discrimination by employers against"any individual" because of age, and
29 U.S.C. § 631(a), which limits ADEA protection to "individuals who are at least 40 years of
age").
318. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1996)
(concluding that replacement by substantially younger employee is more probative of inten-
tional discrimination than class membership).
319. See id. Senator Yarborough made this very point just prior to the passage of the ADEA
in 1967. Noting that section 4 of the bill explicitly prohibited discrimination against an indi-
vidual because of his age, SenatorJavitz had inquired whether the bill that became the ADEA
would "forbid discrimination between two persons each of whom would be between the ages of
40 and 65." See 113 CONG. REc. 31,255 (1967) (statement of Sen.Javitz). Senator Yarborough
responded that if a 42 year-old and a 52 year-old applied for the same job, the employer "could
not turn either one down on the basis of the age factor." See id. (statement of Sen. Yarbor-
ough).
320. It might be argued, however, that age discrimination is actionable only if the victims
and beneficiaries of the discrimination are "significantly" or "substantially" different in age. See
O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 313 (stating that a prima facie case of intentional age discrimination
.cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly
younger"). This interpretation is likely true as a practical matter, for example, in intentional
discrimination wrongful discharge cases where there is little evidence of discriminatory animus
other than replacement by an insignificantly younger employee. See id. at 312 (suggesting that
replacement of a 68 year-old by a 65 year-old is "thin evidence" of age discrimination). But it is
not necessarily true in principle because the holding in O'Connor reads more like an eviden-
tiary guideline than an absolute rule for all ADEA cases. See id. at 312-13 ('[T]he fact that a
replacement is substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of
[intentional] age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone out-
side the protected class.") (emphasis added). Thus, it is conceivable, although perhaps un-
likely from an evidentiary standpoint, that an employer could favor one employee over another
solely because of a one or two-year age-differential.
Assuming the plaintiff can proffer evidence of such discrimination, however, the fact that
there is no substantial age difference between the alleged victim and his or her comparator
should not bar the ADEA claim as a matter of law. The logic of this conclusion is consistent
with Title VII race discrimination cases wherein a black employee's replacement by another
black employee does not pose an automatic bar to suit, as long as there is other circumstantial
evidence of discrimination. See Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1521
(11th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that Title VII protects not simply minorities, but a minority who
can show that he has been discharged, that he is a protected minority, is qualified for the job
from which he was discharged, and lastly, that his position was filled by a non-minority; reason-
ing further that a prima facie case does not have to meet the fourth requirement as long as a
minority can prove that filling of vacancy by another minority was pretextual).
321. See EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 969 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (E.D. Mo. 1997)
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clear, however, why the ADEA's prohibitions would be broader in the
disparate treatment context (i.e., the ADEA is implicated when an
employer, acting on an age stereotype, replaces a fifty-six year-old
with a forty year-old) than in the disparate impact context (the ADEA
is not implicated when a group of fifty-six year-olds are terminated in
favor of a group of forty year-olds due to an unjustifiable, albeit age-
neutral, decision-making factor). As disparate impact discrimination
is "functionally equivalent" to disparate treatment discrimination,2
plaintiffs suing under the former theory should be entitled to the
same protection as plaintiffs suing under the latter.
Indeed, if subgrouping is not permitted, an employer could adopt
a policy which, though facially-neutral, has a significant disparate im-
pact on workers over age sixty, as long as a relatively equal number of
employees age forty or forty-five have not been affected.323 Oddly the
ADEA would be violated when an age-neutral policy discriminates
against sixty year-olds in favor of thirty-nine year-olds, but not when it
discriminates in favor of forty year-olds. Thus, a rule barring sub-
grouping would "permit policies and practices that clearly have an
adverse impact on individuals based on their age to escape judicial
scrutiny.
" 4
The Supreme Court has not condoned subgroup discrimination in
Title VII disparate impact cases.'25 The Court has held that the
"principal focus of [Title VII] is the protection of the individual em-
ployee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a
whole. 326 Thus, individual black employees who are excluded from a
([T]here is no reason to force an employer who has no discriminatory animus to achieve sta-
tistical parity for each ... age subgroup.").
322. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (arguing that disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment are functionally equivalent).
323. See Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 848 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Me. 1994) (providing a similar
hypothetical).
324. Id.; see also Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104, 1129 (D. Del. 1994) (stating that
subgroup discrimination reflects the type of arbitrary age discrimination Congress sought to
prohibit).
325. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455 (1982) (determining that fairness to the class
as a whole does notjustify unfairness to an individual class member; consequently, as the Court
explained, "Tile VII does not permit the victim of a facially discriminatory policy to be told
that he has not been wronged because other persons of his or her race or sex were hired").
Several lower courts have reached a similar conclusion in the context of "sex plus" discrimina-
tion, wherein a subclass of women (such as married women or women with children) have
been permitted to sue under a disparate impact theory even though there is no adverse impact
against women as a class. SeeWambheim v.J.C. Penny Co., 642 F.2d 363,365-66 (9th Cir. 1981)
(applying disparate impact analysis to a claim challenging an insurance policy that granted ma-
ternity benefits only to married women); see also Tuck v. MacGraw-Hill, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 39,
43-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (applying disparate impact analysis to claim that employer's rule prohib-
iting employment of close relatives in same operating unit discriminated against subclass of
married women).
326. Teal 457 U.S. at 453-54.
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selection process would still have a viable disparate impact claim even
if the overall selection process resulted in blacks as a group faring as
well as non-blacks. The same logic should apply under the ADEA
which, according to the Supreme Court, "prohibits discrimination on
the basis of age and not class membership. 3 8
G. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Congress' failure to codify disparate impact analysis in the ADEA
when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 19 9 1 329 does not necessarily re-
flect, as the Tenth Circuit asserts,330 a congressional rejection of age
discrimination claims based on disparate impact. A far more likely
explanation is that Congress chose not to legislate beyond the scope
of what necessitated the disparate impact amendments in the first
place. The major impetus of the CRA's disparate impact amend-
ments was the need to overturn certain Supreme Court decisions that
narrowly interpreted the disparate impact doctrine under Title VII,
not the ADEA.33" ' Thus, by not codifying disparate impact analysis into
other civil rights statutes, such as the ADEA or the Fair Housing Act,
Congress merely exercised legislative restraint.
Congress has, in fact, exercised similar restraint in the past. For in-
stance, in 1990, Congress enacted the Older Workers Benefits Protec-
tion Act ("OWBPA"), which amended the ADEA by expressly placing
the burden on the employer, employment agency, or labor organiza-
tion to prove the bona fide seniority system and the bona fide em-
ployee benefit plan exceptions.3 2 Congress failed to do the same for
the exceptions contained in section 4(f) (1), including the BFOQ ex-
ception.33 Although both the Senate and House bills that reported
out of their respective committees would have allocated the same
burden for the section 4(f) (1) exceptions,334 this provision was de-
327. See id.
328. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996).
329. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
330. See generally Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc, 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir.) (rejecting dispa-
rate impact analysis for ADEA claims because Congress "explicitly added a disparate impact
cause of action to Title VII in the 1991 Civil Rights Act," but added no such parallel provision
to the ADEA), cert.denied, 517 U.S. 1245 (1996).
331. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 32 (1991) ("New Subsections 701(1) through (p) and
703(k) are being added to Title VII to restore the law governing Title VII disparate impact
cases.., prior to the decision in Wards Cove v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).") (emphasis
added).
332. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103, 101 Stat.
978 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1994)).
333. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1994).
334. See H.R. REP. 101-664, at 3, 46-47 (1990) (stating"bona fide occupational qualification"
exception included in section 4(f) (1) is an affirmative defense which the employer bears the
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leted from the final substitute Senate bill that ultimately became the
OWBPA.
This deletion, however, was not due to any particular congressional
view about the proper allocation of burdens under BFOQ exception,
but rather legislative restraint. The impetus for the OWBPA's
amendments was to overturn Public Employees Retirement Systems v.
Betts," where the Supreme Court held that an employee challenging
the validity of an employee benefit plan under the ADEA bears the
burden of proving that the employer had adopted the plan as a sub-
terfuge for intentional age discrimination.336 Because the Betts case
did not involve any of the exceptions contained in section 4(f) (1),
Congress deleted references to those exceptions from the final bill
and left the allocation of the burden of proof for those exceptions to
the courts.337 Accordingly, Congress's failure to codify the BFOQ af-
firmative defense in 1990 did not thereby invalidate the Supreme
Court's long-standing treatment of the BFOQ exception as an af-
firmative defense. 38
The Supreme Court outlined another example of congressional
restraint in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswel,339 this time involving the
appropriate method for analyzing the BFOQ defense under the
ADEA. The Court noted that Congress, in considering a potential
amendment to the ADEA in 1978, implicitly endorsed the two-part
analysis articulated by the Fifth Circuit in 1976 340 but that Congress
rejected the amendment because it "neither added to nor worked
any change upon present law. 34' As Congress acted out of legislative
restraint, the Court lacked support for the conclusion that Congress'
failure to codify this two-part test into the ADEA manifested congres-
sional disapproval of the test. To the contrary, the Court proceeded
burden of proof); S. REP. No. 101-263, at 2, 29-30 (1990) (stating that the employer bears the
burden to plead and prove the defenses contained in section 4(f)).
335. 492 U.S. 158 (1989), rev'd in part by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1994).
336. See id.at 181.
337. See 136 CONG. REc. 13,596-97 (1990) (declaring that bill's managers were "not disturb-
ing or in any way affecting the allocation of the burden of proof for paragraph 4(f) (1) under
pre-Betts law" and that because the allocation of the burden of proof under paragraph 4(f) (1)
was not at issue in Belts, the drafters found no need to address it in the OWBPA).
338. SeeWestern Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416 & nn.23-24 (1985) (holding that
in order to establish a BFOQ defense, an employer needed to show that age was a legitimate
safety-related job qualification).
339. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
340. See id. at 412-415 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's holding in Usery v. Tamiami Trial
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (1976), that, in order to establish age as a BFOQ, the employer must
prove: (1) the job qualifications which the employer invokes to justify his discrimination must
be reasonably necessary to the essence of his business and; (2) the age qualifications must be
more than convenient or reasonable).
341. See id. at 415-16 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-950, at 7 (1978)).
1127
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1071
to reaffirm the two-part test as the law of the land. 2
There are likely many more examples of Congress refraining from
taking action beyond remedying the specific concern before it. In
the case of the CRA, Congress' virtual inaction on the ADEAs41 likely
means nothing more than that the lower courts should determine
whether and when disparate impact analysis may be utilized under
the ADEA.
The CRA, however, remains relevant to the instant debate. Nota-
bly, even as amended, Title VII fails to state explicitly that an em-
ployment practice resulting in unjustified disparate impact is unlaw-
ful; the CRA did not alter the prohibitory language of section 703 (a)
of Title VII. 44 Instead, section 105(a) of the CRA added subsec-
tion(k), that merely refers to an "unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact.0 45 Thus, any application of the disparate
impact theory under Title VII still must invoke the Supreme Court's
long-standing construction of section 703 (a) as prohibiting practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."46
If an inference from the CRA is appropriate, perhaps it should be
that Congress's failure to make disparate impact explicitly an unlaw-
ful employment practice evidences its belief that disparate impact
analysis always has been encompassed by Title VII's prohibitory lan-347
guage. In this light, it was incorrect for the Tenth Circuit to con-
clude that the CRA "explicitly added a disparate impact cause of ac-
tion to Title VII, 148 because that cause of action already existed.
Thus, because the absence of the words "disparate impact" in Title
VII prior to 1991 did not make disparate impact analysis any less le-
gitimate under Title VII, the same should be true for the ADEA after
1991.
342. See id, at 416 (concluding that the two-part inquiry adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Usery
identifies the proper considerations for resolving a BFOQ defense).
343. Although the CRA did amend the ADEA, it altered only the technical, charge-filing
provisions of section 7. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071,
1079 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1994)).
344. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
345. Id.§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
346. See 137 CONG. REc. 15,276 (1991) ("[T]he terms 'business necessity' and 'job re-
lated[ness]' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs...
and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove").
347. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(3), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981) (stating that one purpose of Act is"to confirm statutory authority... for the
adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII") (emphasis added).
348. SeeEllis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245
(1996) (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
Section 15 of the ADEA governing federal-sector employment, is
wholly distinct from section 4, which governs private-sector employ-
ers and state and local governmental entities. Therefore, the statu-
tory and court-fashioned limitations on ADEA claims against private
and state government employers do not apply in the context of fed-
eral-sector age discrimination claims. To be consistent with the legis-
lative history of section 15 and with judicial constructions of Title
VII's federal-sector provision, courts should recognize disparate im-
pact analysis in ADEA cases brought by federal employees. In addi-
tion, sovereign immunity should not be an obstacle to a section 15
claim alleging disparate impact, because disparate impact simply rep-
resents an alternative means of proving unlawful age discrimination,
a claim for which the federal government has already waived its im-
munity.
To the extent the language and legislative history of section 4 bear
on the meaning of section 15, they too show that Congress intended
to prohibit certain ostensibly age-neutral policies that have a dispa-
rate impact on older workers. Congress' failure to codify disparate
impact analysis into the ADEA in 1991 should not alter this conclu-
sion, even though the formulation of the burden of proof for section
4 disparate impact claims remains an unsettled issue.
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